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Abstract:
The Nicaraguan state has historically attempted to control Nicaraguan civil society using
corporatist and liberal-democratic frameworks. This has created a difficult organizing
environment for civil society organizations to struggle for social change. In this thesis, I
argue that civil society organizations, operating in 2008 in a corporatist or liberal
framework, were less effective in achieving national social change than organizations that
worked cooperatively with the state, yet maintained some autonomy. This hypothesis is
developed using the case study of three water rights organizations, and is further tested
using the case of corporatist-structured Citizen Power Councils, created in 2007.

Chapter 1:
Introduction
Introduction
Every morning in Managua I woke at 4:30 am to the sound of water
dripping from the faucet into buckets. My study abroad host father arose before
dawn every morning to take advantage of the few precious hours of running water
delivered to his house. Buckets were filled for use throughout the day to prepare
food, wash dishes, bathe, and flush the toilet. By 7:30 am, the water ceased to
flow. Whatever we had accumulated by that time would have to serve us through
the rest of the day.
In Managua, at least there is running water for part of the day. Other parts
of Nicaragua, specifically in rural areas, lack any water service at all. Water
service, which was nationalized by the revolutionary government in the 1980s,
was slated for privatization by President Violeta Chamorro in the early 1990s.
Using a neoliberal framework, she reasoned that privatized water service would
allow for a more efficient distribution of water. Large sectors of Nicaraguan civil
society1 disagreed, and many organizations began to work against the
privatization of water and other utilities in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan state,
fraught with a history of attempting to control civil society organizations using
either corporatist or liberal-democratic means, endeavored once again to control
the movement that the civil society organizations were creating.

1

I use Borchgrevink’s definition of civil society (2006): “the associational sector ‘between family,
market and state’” (13). Civil society is not necessarily internally democratic, promoting
democracy, or separate from the party structure. My rationale in using this definition is explored
in the beginning of Chapter 3.

1

Each of the three major organizations that worked to stop water
privatization each entered into a different relationship with the state. The
National Consumer Defense Network (RNDC) was co-opted2 by the Nicaraguan
state through corporatist strategies3. The Nicaraguan Communal Movement
(MCN) adopted the liberal-democratic perspective and emphasized complete
autonomy from the state. The Coalition of Organizations for Water Rights
(CODA) chose the middle path, entering into a constructive partnership with the
state while maintaining independence. I refer to this type of relationship as
‘cooperative.’4
In this essay, I use the three organizations that worked against water
privatization to formulate a hypothesis about state-civil society relationships in
Nicaragua. The three types of relationships that they engaged with the state are
emblematic of past relationships between other civil society organizations and the
state. I created a new typology for the state-civil society relationship to describe
existing relationships. I argue that, on a national level, co-optation de-mobilizes
civil society organizations and neutralizes them. Autonomy, or complete
separation from the state, prevents a productive relationship with the state, since
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Co-optation is a situation in which the government, state institutions or a political party attempt
to bring a civil society organization or social movement into their fold by way of direct takeovers,
offering economic or social benefits to members, or exerting political control.
3
I adopt the definition of Wiarda (2003) of corporatism as “a system of state-sponsored, statelicensed, state-organized, state-controlled interest associations; representation and consultation,
therefore, are also corporate, group-centered, or functionally organized, not democratically or by
principle of one person, one vote” (14). Corporatism will be analyzed in greater depth in Chapter
3.
4
State and civil society organizations engage in cooperative relationships when they work
together towards a common goal, without the civil society organization becoming co-opted into
the state structure. Civil society organizations must maintain a significant degree of autonomy
from the state, but may give up some autonomy in order to enter into a partnership with the state.
This type of relationship, although rare, has been observed in Nicaragua previous to the Water
Rights movement. It is most prevalent on a local level.
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the autonomous organization is perceived as a threat to the state and often refuses
to partner with the state. It is a collaborative, cooperative relationship that is most
efficacious in achieving change in Nicaragua. This hypothesis is then tested in
the case of state-organized Citizen Power Councils (CPCs), citizen groups that
were created with close ties to the state.
The scope of this research is the first two years of President Daniel
Ortega’s current presidential term, from 2006-2008, and his relationship with
leftist civil society organizations. A former revolutionary leader, Ortega has
attempted to portray himself as the only legitimate leader of the left in Nicaragua.
The revolutionary legacy of Nicaragua makes Nicaragua unique in Central
America with regards to political polarization: “Nicaragua’s greatest
distinctiveness lies in the strength of leftist identification, roughly double the
regional average, and in the rough parity of leftist and rightist identification…
ideological polarization… [is] almost certainly an effect of revolution and
resistance to it” (Booth & Richard 2006, 126-127). Even given the political
polarity between right and left, the greatest political schism in Nicaragua is
among the left (Borchgrevink 2006). Nicaragua’s left is not homogenous, which
has become increasingly apparent in recent years, particularly since the reelection
of Daniel Ortega.
This trend has been especially evident in analyses of civil society in
Nicaragua. In this paper, I analyze how leftist civil society organizations can
most effectively create meaningful societal and political change in Nicaragua,
especially given the hostile political climate created by the presidency of Daniel
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Ortega. This analysis has led me to a series of questions that this paper explores:
When does a cooperative relationship between the state and civil society become
co-optive? How has co-optation impacted Nicaraguan civil society’s prospects of
achieving meaningful political and societal change? Can fully autonomous
organizations engage with the state to create change effectively?
Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 begins with a brief summary of the historical relationship
between the Nicaraguan state and civil society organizations, emphasizing the
historical use of corporatism. Nicaragua has a long history of co-optation of civil
society by the state and political parties. Beneath the Somoza family dictatorship
(1934-1979), civil society was underdeveloped. The Sandinistas (1979-1990)
encouraged civil society to grow, but as the Contra War of the 1980s raged on, the
economy collapsed and an opposition party formed, the Sandinistas began to coopt a variety of citizen organizations to try to drum up more support for the FSLN
government and policies. When the liberal opposition leader Violeta Chamorro
came to power in 1990, hundreds of civil society organizations formed to
organize the Nicaraguan citizens in a new political and economic context. Her
election marked the advent of neoliberalism5 in Nicaragua. The liberal presidents
from 1990-2006 also attempted to control civil society, in order to govern in a
neopopulist fashion. Chapter 2 also includes an assessment of state and civil
society relationships since the re-election of Daniel Ortega in 2007, focusing on

5

Neoliberalism is an economic and political doctrine that advocates for the freedom of the market,
privatization of services, the need to cut government spending, and de-regulation of the economy.
For a more thorough definition, see Bickham Mendez (2005).
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the changing role and tactics of civil society. Chapter 2 analyzes the relationship
between state and civil society through 2008.
My literature review comprises Chapter 3. First, I define civil society
using an open and inclusive definition that transcends a narrow Western
perspective. Next, I introduce the traditional perspectives on state and civil
society interactions: corporatism and liberalism. I analyze historical and current
scholarship on state and civil society relationships from these two traditions,
focusing on the implications of corporatism and liberalism in the relationship
between the Nicaraguan state and civil society organizations. Ultimately, I reject
these two perspectives because they largely deny agency to civil society
organizations. Instead, I introduce a third perspective: that of cooperation. This
chapter incorporates the historical traditions of Nicaragua, while also offering
other non-Western approaches to civil society, focusing on the cases of state-led
civil society in China and participatory budgeting (PB) in Porto Alegre, Brazil.
The anti-water privatization movement is analyzed in great detail in
Chapter 4. First, I offer a history of this movement, a cohesive history which, to
my knowledge, has not been extensively researched until this paper. I then
analyze the methods and actions of the three civil society groups working on a
national level against water privatization: RNDC, MCN and CODA. I argue that
the CODA employs the best balance between autonomy and cooperation, which
shows in their relative success in advocating against water privatization in
Nicaragua. The MCN adopted the liberal-democratic perspective on state
interactions, and has been largely excluded from the decision-making realm
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because the organization is too autonomous. The state incorporated the RNDC
into the governing system using the corporatist perspective, and the organization
has largely become neutralized because of its relationship with the state.
Chapter 5 analyzes my second case study: the CPCs, and offers this case
as a second corporatist relationship between state and civil society in Nicaragua.
The use of CPCs further explores my hypothesis which states that corporatist
structures are not able to make meaningful change in Nicaragua. I trace the
historical antecedents of the CPCs in Nicaragua, arguing that Ortega used a
similar, corporatist institutional structure to organize Nicaraguans during the
revolutionary years. During the revolution, the state-created, mass organizations
were used to channel support of the general populace to the revolutionary, FSLNled political and societal project. In the first two years of his administration in his
second term of presidency (2006-08), Ortega has once again attempted to
organize citizens in the corporatist tradition in order to bolster support for his
government. This means that the CPCs are closely aligned with both the state and
the FSLN itself. The lack of autonomy, as dictated by corporatism, has meant
that the CPCs are largely unable to work for change in Nicaraguan society.
Chapter 6 concludes the paper. Through summarizing my arguments and
evidence, I demonstrate that the Nicaraguan political climate of 2008 is a very
difficult one for civil society organizations, particularly those on the left who do
not agree with the government, to work for change. Under Daniel Ortega, state
and civil society relations are strained. Ortega, through the formation of the
CPCs, discourages independent forms of civil society organizations. However,

6

the anti-water privatization case demonstrates that some civil society
organizations, such as the CODA, can unite together and engage with the state
without sacrificing too much of their autonomy. Furthermore, this chapter offers
possible theoretical implications of this research, arguing for a more complex and
historically-based understanding of civil society and how it interacts with the state
throughout Latin America.

7

Chapter 2:
Nicaraguan Political and Civil Society Evolution
Introduction
The development of civil society in Nicaragua has depended largely on the
historical progression of politics. In the past thirty years Nicaraguans have
overthrown a brutal military dictatorship, experienced a socialist revolution, and
transitioned to a neoliberal democracy. In this chapter, I trace the development of
civil society from under the dictatorship of the Somoza family from 1934-79 until
2008. The chapter is divided by political periods in order to examine the impact
of political society on the historical development of civil society. Using a
historical perspective, I argue that the Nicaraguan state has continually attempted
to control civil society for its own benefit. While all of the presidents attempt to
control civil society, the methods they have used to control civil society and
political rationale behind those methods vary greatly.6
Some political leaders, such as the Somozas and Daniel Ortega, have used
a system of corporatism to build support for their regimes. Liberal presidents such
as Arnoldo Alemán and Enrique Bolaños expressed a deep distrust for civil
society, and attempted to limit the realm of civil society and govern in a
neopopulist style instead. Violeta Chamorro, president during the transition from
Sandinista rule to liberal rule, also employed liberalism, although she continued to
work in some capacity with civil society organizations.
Civil society organizations were closely tied to the state during the
Somoza regime and during the beginning of the Sandinista Revolution. With the
6

While the political ideologies of Nicaraguan leaders have been very diverse, this paper focuses
on how those leaders (regardless of ideology) have interacted with civil society organizations.
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disillusionment with the revolutionary project growing in the late 1980s, civil
society began to assert its autonomy from the Nicaraguan state. The corporatist
Sandinista government left power in 1990, following the election of Violeta
Chamorro. Her election marked the beginning of 16 years of liberal rule in
Nicaragua, under which the liberal leaders distrusted civil society and attempted
to control civil society using legal means to limit the civic sphere. The return of
Daniel Ortega, a former revolutionary Sandinista, to the presidency in 2006
provided for an illustration of how the FSLN7 continued to attempt to control
leftist civil society8 through a corporatist mind-set.
Many civil society organizations have rejected the continued attempts of
the Nicaragua state to control and organize civil society in Nicaragua, and instead
have chosen to exert their partial or full autonomy from the Nicaraguan state and
political parties. Historical examples include the founding of the Nicaraguan
Communal Movement (MCN) in 1987, and the reaction of civil society to the
mishandling of the relief efforts relating to Hurricane Mitch in 1998. The Civil
Coordinator (CC), formed following the hurricane to assist the government with
relief and rebuilding efforts in Nicaragua. Briefly, this organization engaged
cooperatively with the state. After the hurricane relief efforts ended, the
organization over-emphasized autonomy and struggled to work cooperatively
with the state. The rejection of state interaction, therefore, does not come without
7

FSLN is the Spanish acronym for the Sandinista Front for National Liberation, the political party
that violently overthrew the dictatorship in 1979, governed until 1990, and returned to the
presidency in 2006. This organization was named after Augusto Sandino, a nationalist peasant
leader who Anastasio Somoza ordered killed in 1934 while Somoza was the head of the National
Guard. Sandino was seen as the last legitimate threat to Somoza, and the guerrilla movement used
his name to represent their cause while fighting against the dictatorship.
8
This chapter focuses on left-leaning civil society organizations, as they have historically been the
strongest in Nicaragua, and that my research focuses exclusively on left-leaning organizations.
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consequences: this chapter illustrates how the continued struggles with the state
have created cleavages among the left-leaning organizations and individuals in
Nicaraguan society.
Following my analysis of the historical development of civil society-state
relations, I offer an evaluation of the state of Nicaragua’s civil society as of late
2008, focusing on my own field work in Nicaragua conducted in the spring of
2008 and a report on Nicaraguan civil society by Axel Borchgrevink.9 I focus on
trends in Nicaraguan civil society, relating to how civil society organizations
interact with the state, each other, and their constituencies.
History of Nicaraguan Civil Society
The Somoza Family Dynasty (1934-1979)
The Somoza family controlled Nicaragua during the middle of the
twentieth century. Anastasio Somoza García ruled until his death in 1956, after
which his two sons held power until being over-thrown by the Sandinistas in
1979. According to Nicaraguan historian Thomas Walker (2003), “The Somoza
formula was really rather simple: maintain the support of the [national] guard,
cultivate the Americans, and co-opt important domestic power contenders” (26,
emphasis added). Under the military dictatorship, civil society was largely coopted. The Somoza regime organized various sectors of society in order to add
support and false legitimacy to their puppet governments. For decades, civil
society organizations lacked autonomy and were subservient to the state. “The
regime itself supported and promoted certain forms of organization, most
9

Borchgrevink is a social anthropologist, who focused on development aid and civil society in
Central America. His report was commissioned by the Norwegian Institute of International
Affairs in 2006.
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important unions, but also organizations of youth, students, women, farmers,
retired soldiers and community organizations. Through different means and
benefits, leaders of these organizations were co-opted and the organizations
served as a social basis for the dictatorship” (Borchgrevink 2006, 17). This
approach by the state to civil society kept the Somozas in power for over forty
years.
By the 1960s, the growing discontent with the dictatorship manifested
itself in autonomous organizations, which often had to meet clandestinely for fear
of retaliation by the Somoza government. The most important of these
organizations grew into the guerrilla organization that overthrew the dictatorship
in 1979: the FSLN. The FSLN began as a socialist student group in 1961 and
gathered popular support throughout the 1960s and 1970s as it waged a war of
national liberation against the Somozas, whose regime had become increasingly
authoritarian and violent.
In the final stages of the offensive against Somoza, other organizations
that had formed autonomous of the Somoza regime began to ally themselves with
the FSLN, despite ideological differences. At this time in Nicaragua, most people
and organizations opposed to the dictatorship allied themselves with the
Sandinistas. When the Sandinistas finally seized power in 1979, they were simply
the single largest group that opposed the Somoza regime.10 The group that took
power in 1979 was mostly comprised of FSLN members, but included
Nicaraguans of other political and ideological inclinations.

10

Ironically, it was an organization named after Augusto Sandino, who was killed as he opposed
the first Somoza dictator, that finally overthrew his son (the third and final Somoza dictator).
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This section has illustrated that the Somozas controlled civil society using
corporatist mechanisms during their dynastic reign in Nicaragua. They used their
control of specific groups in society to support their government. Even with this
control, the FSLN developed in the 1960s as an autonomous challenge to Somoza
rule. With the support of other autonomous organizations from various locations
on the ideological spectrum, the FSLN overthrew the Somoza dictatorship in
1979.
Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) 1979-1990
The Sandinistas wanted to create a revolutionary, socialist society that
would mark a radical change from the past forty-five years of dictatorship. Upon
seizing power, the Sandinista leadership enacted ambitious plans for literacy and
health campaigns, and land reform. In order to implement their plans for a
revolutionary society, they needed the support of organized Nicaraguan citizens.
Thus, they created several mass organizations, located within the party structure.
“The Sandinista vanguardist ideology, which saw the party as the legitimate
leader of the revolutionary process, meant that these mass organizations were
subservient to the FSLN” (Borchgrevink 2006, 18). These mass organizations
were not democratic; instead they were dominated by party elite.
The organizations were billed as a way to link the needs and desires of the
people with the Sandinista party, and therefore the state that the party governed.
The FSLN had markedly different political, social and economic ideologies than
the Somoza dynasty. Their socialist doctrine was a radical change from the
Somozas. However, with regards to how the FSLN interacted with civil society,
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similarities could be seen between the FSLN and the Somozas. Although the
FSLN claimed to want a break with the past, they continued in the Somoza
tradition of controlling civil society through a system of corporatism to benefit the
state. “The lines between state, party and mass organizations were blurred, while
authority lay unquestioningly with the party and its centralized decision-making
structure” (Borchgrevink 2006, 18).
At the beginning of their government, the Sandinistas appeared to use their
mass organizations for the benefit of the people: in the case of the five-month
Literacy Brigade in 1980, “over 100,000 volunteers (mainly young people) had
taught over 400,000 (mainly adults) to read and write” (Barndt 1985, 328). At
this time, around 400,000 people were estimated to be in a Sandinista-organized
civil society organization. The mass organizations helped the Sandinista
vanguard party to improve the lives of hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans in
the early 1980s. However, the motivations of the FSLN with regards to mass
organizations came into question in the late 1980s.
In the early 1980s, with the election of President Ronald Reagan in the
United States, there was growing international discontent with the Sandinista-led
government. The government continued to use mass organizations to
communicate community needs to the FSLN leadership. By 1984, “half of all
Nicaraguans aged sixteen or older were members in voluntary support
organizations” (Walker 2003, 50). However, as the economic crisis engulfing
Nicaragua worsened and the U.S.-funded contra war intensified, internal
discontent also grew. The FSLN leadership began to convert the state-controlled

13

civil society organizations that were serving the citizens into organizations that
served the state, through neighborhood surveillance and other organized support
of the state. Civil society organizations were increasingly directed to defend the
revolution instead of representing constituencies to the state (Castillo 2008).
This new role for Sandinista mass civil society organizations caused two
major mass organizations to declare their independence and autonomy from the
FSLN. The Sandinista Defense Committees (CDSs), frustrated with their new
role as a vigilante and defense organization instead of a community organizing
committee, broke ties with the Sandinistas in 1987 and became the MCN (Castillo
2008).11 The Association of Nicaraguan Women Luisa Amanda Espinosa
(AMNLAE) voted to become independent from the FSLN in 1987, arguing that
the FSLN was using AMNLAE to support the Sandinista political party for
support instead of prioritizing women’s issues and providing support to women
(Hoyt, 1997, 65).
These two major splits of key mass society organizations were emblematic
of a growing disillusionment of the increasingly centralistic style of governance
that the FSLN began to exhibit in the mid- to late-1980s. Faced with civil war
and economic crisis, the FSLN began to use civil society organizations to direct
support to the party instead of using the organizations to work for improving the
lives of citizens. Some civil society organizations refused to take part in the
continued corporatist domination of civil society by the state, and exercised their
agency by declaring independence from the FSLN-controlled state. Disillusioned
individuals also began to split from the FSLN and founded their own leftist civil
11

This event will be described in greater detail in Chapter 5.
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society organizations. During the contra war, even if these organizations were
leftist, they were often perceived to be confrontational. Those independent, leftist
organizations, not to mention the right-leaning organizations, were marginalized
and isolated by the Nicaraguan state in the 1980s, as the Sandinista-controlled
organizations had a privileged role in society and a privileged access to the state.
Socially and ideologically, the FSLN represented a huge break from the
past of the Somoza dictatorship. However, the FSLN continued to use a system
of corporatism in an attempt to organize civil society. They endeavored to use
corporatism to better organize people in Nicaragua to create a revolutionary
society, but internal and economic problems led the Sandinista leadership to take
advantage of the civil society organizations. This, in turn, led to the first largescale formation of autonomous organizations in Nicaragua, many of which were
of leftist political ideologies but were no longer supporters of the major leftist
political party, the FSLN.
National Opposition Union (UNO) and President Violeta Chamorro (1990-1997)
In 1990, the FSLN un-expectedly lost the election to a coalition political
party, known as UNO.12 The political climate of Nicaragua was suddenly turned
on its head, and this political transformation marked a radical chance in civil
society: “Whereas the arena in the eighties had been dominated by the Sandinista
mass organizations, with their close links to the state and governing party, the

12

For further information on the electoral defeat, see my paper, “A Suprising Defeat? Using the
Importance of People to Explain the 1990 Electoral Defeat of the Sandinistas” (2006) found at
http://www.macalester.edu/las/PaulDoshCourseResources.html. UNO was a political coalition
that began loosely in 1982 of mostly people who had fought with the Sandinistas to overthrow the
Sandinistas but were disgruntled with the governing style of the Sandinistas. The coalition was
not cohesive and dissolved before the 1996 elections.
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situation of these organizations was drastically changed overnight” in that they
“lost the dominate position within Nicaraguan civil society that they had help
during the 1980s. The new situation also gave rise to reconsiderations of the
relationship to the FSLN within these organizations” (Borchgrevink 2006, 20).
With the Sandinistas out of power for the first time in eleven years, the
Sandinista organizations had to adapt to less funding from the state and to less
access to state institutions. With fewer incentives to remain coupled to the FSLN,
some of mass Sandinista organizations began to question their dependence on the
FSLN and began a process of separation:
This partial de-linking from the FSLN was a painful process for
many, made even more so by the strong affective values attached
to revolutionary steadfastness, the very strong political polarization
of the period (either you were a Sandinista or an anti-Sandinista),
and the feeling that many were letting the collective project down
by leaving the organizations in order to fend for themselves (for
instance by establishing their own NGOs) (Borchgrevink 2006,
20).
This political polarization in the newly altered civil society landscape continued
to accentuate the differences among leftist civil society organizations in
Nicaragua.
The newly altered civil society landscape also included an explosion of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Nicaragua. This phenomenon,
observed in the early 1990s, can be explained in several ways. The government
of Violeta Chamorro began implementing neoliberal measures that created a
withdrawal of state services. This created a need for NGOs to fill the spaces left
by the withdrawal of the state. International donors were willing to fund
Nicaraguan NGOs in the 1990s, because many no longer feared that they were
16

funding communists.13 There existed a large group of qualified people to staff the
NGOs, who were searching for new ways to pursue idealistic and political causes
after they no longer could work for the state or the FSLN. Former Sandinista
party leaders or government employees often began careers at NGOs after their
jobs were cut due to political or economic (neoliberal) reasons. The NGOs also
offered an opportunity to pursue political and social objectives without the FSLN
dictating allowable actions. It provided an opportunity for independence for the
staff from the Sandinista institutional structure, although many continued to
maintain “close ties with the FSLN” (Borchgrevink 2006, 23).
The Chamorro presidency marked an era of tumultuous coordination
between the Chamorro administration and left-leaning civil society organizations.
Chamorro created a new legal framework that favored NGOs over other types of
organizations. NGOs were necessary in Nicaragua to fulfill vacuums left by a
receding neoliberal state, and therefore were accepted by Chamorro, who
attempted to control them through legal means. Registered civil society
organizations were subjected to laws and rules about actions they could and could
not undertake. Chamorro viewed many civil society organizations with fear or
contempt, as she believed they were merely pawns of the FSLN. Therefore, she
represented a break with the corporatist past.
Some coordination between organizations that were largely autonomous
from the state and the government began to take place, according to Borchgrevink
(2006). It was only tied to specific social issues (often about women, children and
13

Some international donors were reluctant to fund Nicaraguan civil society organizations in the
1980s due to fears of communism and socialism during the Cold War. This fear was exacerbated
during the contra war.
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families) and was most successful on a local level. Civil society organizations
were often reluctant to become involved in a relationship with the state, as many
either distrusted or did not like the Chamorro regime or did not want to lose their
new-founded independence.
The mutual feelings of antipathy between the national government and
civil society organizations made it challenging for more meaningful partnerships
to occur on a national level. The Chamorro government attempted to control
Nicaraguan civil society, and introduced a new system of legal constraints on the
actions of civil society to do so. However, unlike the Somoza and Sandinista
governments, Chamorro did not draw upon state-organized civil society
organizations to support her government. Instead, we see that the FSLN
continues to try to garner support for the Sandinistas using the corporatist model,
even when they are outside of executive power of the state. During Chamorro’s
government, the split between the FSLN and non-FSLN leftist organizations
widened, as the FSLN continued to attempt to exert control over civil society.
Many leftist organizations maintained their links with the FSLN, while others
began to question and challenge the hegemonic position (in politics and society)
that the FSLN held over the Nicaraguan left.
The Liberal Era (1997-2006)
In 1997, Arnoldo Alemán, alluded to in the previous section, became
president of Nicaragua. He was the leader of the Constitutional Liberal Party
(PLC).14 Alemán had a strained relationship with civil society: he targeted them

14

The PLC is one of two major liberal parties in Nicaragua. The other is the National Liberal
Alliance (ALN) which was founded in 2005 after growing disgust with Alemán, political
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and the work that they did in Nicaragua. This opposition to civil society was
emblematic of neopopulism, a term that aptly describes Alemán. “Unlike the old
populists who promoted labor unions and other organs of civil society,
neopopulists… appealed directly to the politically unorganized sectors of society.
Indeed, such leaders actually feared and disliked organized civil society” (Walker
2003, 64). Alemán tried to control civil society using legal means, and wanted
more regulations of NGOs by the central government. In his rhetoric, he
identified organized civil society as appendages of the Sandinistas, and since he
blamed the FSLN for most of the problems in society, he transitively blamed
organized civil society.
In 1998, Hurricane Mitch hit Nicaragua and devastated the country.
Thousands of Nicaraguans perished in the 10-day battering of the storm, and over
800,000 lost their homes. The damage was estimated at $1 billion, over half of
the gross national product. The Alemán administration was criticized in
Nicaragua for the way in which relief efforts were carried out, and civil society
organizations began to work together in order to help the country that was reeling
from this devastating storm in the face of government inadequacy. This
coordination led to the creation of the Civil Coordinator (CC), which was the first
successful major coordinating effort to unite disparate civil society organizations
in the politically polarized Nicaraguan society.15

corruption, and el pacto. As of 2008, the ALN allied itself with the conservative party in
Nicaragua. The PLC and ALN often vote together in the National Assembly.
15
According to Pérez Leiva (2008), a left-leaning prominent civil society organizer in Nicaragua,
former Commander in the FSLN, and a member of the CC, the Civil Coordinator is one of a few
powerful coalitions operating in Nicaragua as of 2008, with over 300 member organizations.
Borchgrevink (2006) argues it is the best example of a successful coalition in Nicaragua.
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Initially, the CC was solely focused on providing relief and support to
Nicaraguans affected by the hurricane. In the following years, many
organizations that participated in the CC realized that they had strength in
numbers. They began to develop a basic platform with which to present the
government. The development of this platform was highly controversial, as
different organizations could not decide which issues to prioritize and address.
This led to some of the organizations dropping out of the coordinating body over
disputes. Notably, the CC decided to not register itself as an official civil society
organization with the central government, because they did not want to subject
themselves to Alemán’s rules. Furthermore, they wanted the freedom to lobby the
government in a variety of ways, and feared their loss of independence if they
worked too closely to the state (Pérez Leiva 2008).
One of the most important aspects of the CC lobbying platform was the
desire for the creation of CONPES (National Economic and Social Planning
Council). CONPES represented an institutionalized structure for the state to
consult with members of civil society organizations at a national level.16 Alemán
was opposed to the formation of CONPES, but eventually bowed to pressure in
late 1999 and CONPES was established. Ironically, Alemán’s hostility towards
civil society led to a partial unification and consolidation of Nicaraguan civil
society, including groups from all areas of the political spectrum.
It became apparent by the end of Alemán’s presidency that the deepest
cleavage in civil society was “within the left, between supporters and opponents

16

The institutional structures it created on a municipal and departmental level will be discussed in
detail in the chapter on CPCs.
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of the current FSLN leadership” (Borchgrevink 2006, 28). Even out of executive
power, the FSLN continued to try to exert its control over leftist civil society,
some of which largely enjoyed the independence it had experienced in recent
years and was reluctant to cultivate close ties with the FSLN. Growing frustration
with the FSLN as an inadequate political party to represent the left led to the
founding of the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) by Sergio Ramirez, a
former member of the FSLN, in 1995 (Walker 2003, 56). Ramirez challenged the
top-tier leadership of the FSLN, specifically Daniel Ortega, who refused to give
up power in the party after serving as president from 1984-1990, and running
(unsuccessfully) for re-election in 1990. However, many organizations remained
loyal to Ortega and wanted to be involved in the FSLN: they were willing to give
up some autonomy in order to have access to the party structure, and hoped that
Ortega would be re-elected and that they would then have privileged access to the
state and would be rewarded for their loyalty. These organizations continued to
believe in the FSLN ideology. They were in sharp contrast to leftist organizations
that harbored major reservations about the leadership of Daniel Ortega.
The concerns about Ortega proved well-founded when he made a pact
with liberal president Alemán. In 1999, Ortega’s step-daughter claimed that
Ortega had sexually abused her since the age of 11, beginning in 1978. Arnoldo
Alemán, the liberal president at the time the scandal surfaced, was embroiled in
his own scandal: he was accused of political corruption. Alemán and Ortega
joined forces to prevent jail time for themselves in a move that is colloquially
referred to by Nicaraguans as el pacto: the pact.

21

El pacto was more than an agreement between the two men to prevent jail
time. It also re-wrote the political rules in Nicaragua regarding elections. Before
the pact, a presidential candidate needed to receive 45 percent of the vote to gain
the presidency. Without this plurality, a runoff was held between the top two
vote-receivers. Under el pacto, a presidential candidate could win an election
with only 35 percent of the first-round vote, if the candidate with the second-most
votes received 5 percent less of the vote or more than the top vote-getter. This
favored Ortega, who perpetually lost in run-off elections, yet won the first rounds.
This pacto was viewed by much of Nicaraguan society as overtly corrupt, and
created further tensions between left-leaning organizations and the FSLN, who
continued to try to exert control over the civil society organizations on the left.
The cleavage between the left in Nicaragua illustrated itself in the
electoral realm in 2001, when Daniel Ortega lost his third consecutive presidential
bid to Enrique Bolaños, the hand-picked successor of Alemán. Bolaños continued
to attempt to dominate civil society without recognizing its strength and
legitimacy, although he was more willing to work with civil society than Alemán.
Under the presidency of Bolaños, “tensions between government and civil society
have certainly been reduced, [but] CONPES has not become a stronger vehicle for
civil society influence on government policies, and the Coordinadora Civil seems
to be weakened” (Borchgrevink 2006, 28).
One possible explanation for the weakening of the CC was the founding of
the Social Coordinator (CS) in 2005. The CS is comprised of 37 organizations
that have close ties to the FSLN (Borchgrevink 2006, 47). The two coalitions
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(CC and CS) are not mutually exclusive, which further complicates issues.
Differences were exacerbated from 2006-2008, during the second presidency of
Ortega. These differences emerged due to disagreements as to how close civil
society organizations wanted to be with the state and political parties.
During the liberal period, both presidents attempted to control civil society
to minimize the civic sphere. Governing in the neopopulist style, Alemán
attempted to control civil society using a more stringent legal method than what
Chamorro developed in the early 1990s. He detested civil society, and engaged in
frequent confrontations with civil society, which he saw as overwhelming leftist
and Sandinista. After the devastation of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, civil society
organizations began to work together to lobby the Alemán government for
changes. The major coordinating council at the time, the CC, continues to be an
important structure in Nicaraguan society and has remained relatively
autonomous of the state. During the Bolaños administration, cleavages in
Nicaraguan leftist civil and political society began to widen, seen in the formation
of the CS. Those cleavages would be greatly exacerbated with the re-election of
Daniel Ortega to the presidency in 2006.
The Return of Daniel Ortega and the FSLN (2006-2008)
After relinquishing power in 1990 following his electoral defeat to Violeta
Chamorro, Daniel Ortega spent 16 years out of the presidency, but he continued
to be the leader of the FSLN. He ran for presidency in 2006, and won the contest
with 38 percent of the vote.17 With the FSLN leadership back in power, this

17

Under the new electoral rules established in el pacto, Ortega was able to win the 2006 elections
in the first round with a plurality. Many Nicaraguans alleged that el pacto was corrupt, and
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guaranteed that organizations that had maintained ties with the FSLN during
liberal rule were also more powerful. Once again, these civil society
organizations had privileged access to the government and privileged sources of
funding for their activities. The FSLN reverted to its historical use of corporatism
to attempt to re-energize the political party, especially given that only 38 percent
of Nicaraguans voted for them.
One of the most controversial aspects of Nicaragua civil society in the first
two years of Ortega’s presidency was the creation of Citizen Power Councils, or
CPCs. Although this phenomenon will be discussed in great detail in my fifth
chapter, it is important to note here that the CPCs are an example of how the
FSLN once again used mass organizations to build strength for their party in
Nicaragua. The CPCs received governmental funding and, since they answered
directly to Daniel Ortega’s wife, Rosario Murillo, they were given a unique form
of access to the president.
The return of the FSLN to power has exacerbated divisions in civil
society. According to Pérez Leiva, “this government is trying to destroy
independent civil society” and the best hope civil society has to stand up to
Ortega’s government and work for political and social change in Nicaragua is to
“unite to defend itself with unified strategies.” Ortega has adopted a mentality of
‘either you are with us, or you are against us’ with regards to civil society. This
means that some civil society organizations are now “linked with the state, while
others are para-parties. Some organizations are overtly pro-government or pro-

therefore labeled the 2006 electoral win of Ortega as corrupt. Regardless of the manner in which
Ortega regained the presidency, the FSLN was once again the ruling party of Nicaragua.
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party [pro-FSLN]” (Pérez Leiva 2008). Others have come out against the FSLN.
This dichotomy means that it was very challenging for coalitions and coordinating
bodies in civil society, like the CC, to create basic platforms and lobbying
strategies. Ortega has created an environment for civil society that welcomes
groups who will ally themselves with the state and not question state policies, and
ostracizes and alienates organizations that declare themselves independent of the
state and the FSLN. This means that civil society, as a whole, was very
fragmented and inarticulate with regards to sector demands. As Pérez Leiva
(2008) stated, “each organization is playing their own drum” without taking into
account the other rhythms in society. The complex historical interaction between
state and civil society is illustrated below in Chart 2.1.

Chart 2.1: Civil Society and the State
Political Party and State
Autonomy of
Time Frame
perspective on Civil Society
civil society
Somoza dynasty
1934-mid 1960s
-Corporatist
-No autonomy
Mid-1960s-1979

-Corporatist

-Antidictatorship
organizations
begin to assert
autonomy

Sandinistas/FSLN
1979-mid 1980s

-Corporatist

-Limited
autonomy, stateorganized most
of civil society
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Characteristics of Civil
Society

-Civil society totally
subservient to the state
-Anti-dictatorship
organizations
completely
autonomous from the
state
-Civil society
dominated by stateorganized, mass
organizations that
served the people

Mid 1980s-1990

Violeta Chamorro
(UNO)
1990-1997

Liberals
Arnoldo Aleman
(PLC)
1997-2001

Enrique Bolaños
(APRE)
2001-2006
Daniel Ortega
(FSLN)
2006-2008

-Corporatist

-Polarized civil
society:
autonomy for
organizations
that declare
independence,
cooptation of
FSLN-allied
organizations

-Civil society
dominated by stateorganized mass
organizations that
served the state, and a
few newlyindependent leftist
organizations

-Transition,
then Liberal

-Many former
state/FSLNdominated
organizations
declare
autonomy from
the state.

-Civil society becomes
NGO-ized. Some
coordination between
state and civil society
at a local level relating
to
women/children/family
issues.

-Liberal and
Neo-populist

-High degree of
autonomy

-Civil society
organizations seen as
hostile by Aleman,
who attempts to
silence civil society
organizations. Some
coordination with the
Civil Coordinator

-Liberal

-High degree of
autonomy

-Limited coordination
with the state.

-Corporatist

-Mixed degrees
of autonomy
(depending on
whether or not
allied with the
state)

-Differences among
left-leaning
organizations
exacerbated and
exploited by Ortega.
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Political Trends in Nicaraguan Civil Society
In this section, I examine political trends of civil society through 2008. I
identify several themes, including a growing disillusionment with the FSLN, an
increased effort on lobbying and advocacy work by civil society organizations,
consultations of civil society organizations by the state, weak institutionalization
of state-civil society cooperation, and civil society organizations taking the role of
the ‘watchdog.’ This section highlights the impact that Ortega’s reelection has
had on civil society organization and political inclinations of civil society in
Nicaragua.
Disillusionment with the FSLN
Beginning in the mid- to late-1980s, the first wide-spread disillusionment
with the FSLN political project began to show itself among leftists and became
increasingly apparent with the founding of the MRS in 1995. This political
disillusionment became increasingly widespread after el pacto in 1999. El pacto
blurred the lines between the FSLN leadership and the PLC leadership, and
brought into question the ideology of both of these political parties. “Increasing
dissatisfaction between FSLN leadership… has led many to question the
traditional political map which places the FSLN on the left, confronting the
liberals of the right. Instead, they see a political landscape where the political
class and the two major political parties conspire against democracy and popular
interests” (Borchgrevink 2006, 46). This excerpt highlights one of the reasons
that leftist civil society organizations began to distance themselves from the
FSLN, even if they had Sandinista roots.
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How does this disillusionment impact the ability of civil society
organizations to coordinate with each other and the state? The answer to this
question varies depending on the time frame it is addressing. During the Bolaños
period, leftist civil society organizations were more open to working with a liberal
state. Borchgrevink (2006) argues that organizations of the left “gradually…
started cooperating with institutions of the state governed by liberals, as well as
with other civil society organizations of different backgrounds” (46). As of 2006,
Borchgrevink offers his analysis that Nicaraguan society was not splintered or
fragmented. He acknowledges that it was not cohesive, but gives examples (such
as the CC) of civil society coalitions that work together despite political
differences and in spite of a challenging and polarized political environment.
Since Ortega took office in early 2007, civil society has become increasingly resplintered. This is not to say that there an no examples of successful partnerships
under Ortega’s government: one of the organizations I analyze in Chapter 4 is the
Coalition of Organizations for Water Rights (CODA), which has been able to
unite disparate organizations in the face of a difficult political environment. This
case will be analyzed more extensively in my chapter on water privatization.
Furthermore, the actions Ortega has undertaken since he took office in
2007 have further frustrated many civil society organizations. Janeth Castillo, a
leftist community organizer with the MCN, states that “it is very difficult to work
for change with this government. They want a political way that is very vertical
and authoritarian. It’s hard to work with a government that only criticizes
independent civil society” (Castillo 2008). Ortega’s hard-line stance against
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autonomous civil society has led to disillusionment among those independent
organizations.
Lobbying, Advocacy and Legal Reforms
As a result of an NGO-ized civil society, there was more importance on
lobbying and advocacy issues as opposed to direct action. There existed an
“increasing orientation towards campaigns, lobbying and advocacy” among civil
society organizations. Most of the organizations I visited with in Nicaragua18 told
me that they prioritized working for legal reforms when they wanted to change a
policy in Nicaragua. For example, as will be expanded in Chapter 4, the National
Assembly passed the National General Water Law (LGAN)19 in 2007 as a result
of lobbying of the national government by various sectors of civil society. Many
civil society organizations expressed concerns that the law is not strong enough,
and wanted to lobby the government in order to make it more stringent (Pérez
2008).
This advocacy work was coupled by a new focus on civil and human
rights in Nicaragua. According to Pérez Leiva (2008), it is necessary to
“empower the citizens so that they can defend their own rights,” those rights that
are supposedly guaranteed by the state. By undertaking educational campaigns
about civil and human rights in Nicaragua, civil society organizations indirectly
influence politics. According to Nicaraguan civil society expert, Dora Maria
Tellez (2008), Nicaragua experiences a “rights deficiency” in which citizens do
18

RNDC, MCN, LIDECONIC, SIMAS, CISAS, ADIC, and La Cuculmeca.
The LGAN, described in Chapter 4 in greater detail, is a law in response to a mandate that stated
that water concessions could not be made until a generalized water law was passed by the National
Assembly. It prohibits the privatization of water service, but does not define water privatization.
Furthermore, it does not explicitly prohibit the privatization of water sources.

19
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not feel like they have the right to rights. By undertaking popular education
campaigns about rights, then citizens know that they have rights to demand, and
may demand them separately from organized civil society groups.
The emphasis on rights advocacy and legal reforms means that some
organizations are better equipped to make change in society than others. The
more professionalized and better funded organizations (often NGOs) are able to
hire a lawyer to oppose the laws. “Many organizations do not have the resources
to have a lawyer, and even though we can always protest, this emphasis means
that the average person’s voice is getting harder to hear” (Castillo 2008).
Advocacy work, while increasingly common, is not accepted by all civil society
organizations. I talked to the Nicaraguan Social Movement-Another World is
Possible (MSN-Otro Mundo es Posible) which split from the CODA because they
believed the CODA to be too legal oriented, and the MSN believed that “popular
mobilization is the only way to oppose water privatization” in Nicaragua (Jarquin
2008).
Consultations between State and Civil Society
Consultations between state and civil society have occurred most
effectively at a local level, as seen during the tenure of Violeta Chamorro.
Municipal governments and mayors often work closely with civil society
organizations on a variety of issues. Again, the NGO-ization of Nicaraguan civil
society signified that NGO employees often have technical expertise and legal
experience that the state wants to take advantage of and put to use. Whether or
not a government chooses to consult with a civil society organization all too often
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depends on the political affiliation of the civil society organization or individual.
Consultations, done correctly, can be a part of a cooperative relationship between
the state and civil society organizations on a national level.
Weak Institutionalization of State-Civil Society Initiatives
One of the challenges of interactions between the state and civil society is
that they fluctuate depending on who is in power. Throughout this paper, I have
argued that Nicaraguan presidents and dictators are similar in that they try to
control civil society. Each feared opposing voices and opinions, as they did not
want their weaknesses as leaders exposed. However, as my analysis has shown,
each of the presidents has a different way to control civil society, and each want
to control civil society for different reasons. Ortega, for example, used
corporatism to try to lend support and legitimacy to his government. He used
community organizations to bolster support for his government. Alemán, on the
other hand, distrusted civil society and tried to control it through legal means. His
neopopulist, liberal governing style meant that he instead appealed to the nonorganized masses for support. He detested civil society organizations themselves,
and attempted to control them by isolating them from the state, in the liberal
tradition. With each president, different state institutions that relate to civil
society were created and used for different purposes. Therefore, meaningful and
lasting state and civil society interactions were infrequent.
The political polarization of Nicaragua’s political system and civil society
means that civil society was often dominated by political parties and perceptions
of partisanship. The return of Daniel Ortega to the Nicaraguan presidency was
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the latest challenge for leftist civil society organizations. There were advantages
and disadvantages to being allied with the Sandinistas in the national government,
as will be further demonstrated in Chapter 4.
Monitoring the National Government
Nicaraguan civil society organizations have played the watchdog role
since the 1990s. The Civil Coordinator was formed out of organizations
concerned with the poor response of the Nicaraguan government to the
devastation of Hurricane Mitch, and illustrates a historical representation of
cooperative relationships between state and civil society organizations in
Nicaragua. When a hurricane struck Nicaragua in 1998, many Nicaraguans
feared a governmental response similar to what happened after a major
earthquake during the Somoza regime.
In 1972, a disastrous earthquake struck Nicaragua that leveled Managua
and killed 10,000 people. The relief funds were grossly misused: “Somoza…
chose to turn the national disaster to short-term personal advantage. While
allowing the National Guard to plunder and sell international relief materials and
to participate in looting the devastated commercial sector, Somoza and his
associates used their control of the government to channel international relief
funds into their own pockets” (Walker 2003, 31). With Hurricane Mitch, civil
society organizations demanded accountability from then-President Alemán in
hopes that something so cruel could never happen to the victims of the 1998
hurricane. The CC formed as a relief coalition, to work with the government in
distributing aid and rebuilding Nicaragua in a cooperative manner after the
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hurricane. Initially working in cooperation with the government, the CC was able
to maintain enough autonomy to serve as a watchdog of the government’s use of
international funds. After the hurricane relief efforts ended, the CC became too
autonomous and was alienated from the liberal state. Consumer defense
organizations have also proliferated in Nicaragua in the past decade, the largest
being the National Consumer’s Defense Network (RNDC).
Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated the historical development of civil society in
Nicaragua, focusing on the relationship civil society has developed with the
Nicaraguan state. It has specifically focused on the relationship between leftist
organizations and the FSLN, which curiously uses corporatism both when in and
out of state power. Ortega has dominated the FSLN for over thirty years in
Nicaragua, and his use of corporatism to attempt to channel support to his
political party has put leftist organizations between a rock and a hard place. They
must either give up their independence and their ability to engage the state on
their terms, or they become autonomous but then are shut-out of decision making
and often are denied access to state institutions and key decision makers. Yet
their autonomy signifies that they are able to act in whatever way they see fit to
create change in Nicaragua. This dilemma is voiced by Borchgrevink (2006),
who questions, “When does cooperation become cooptation? When does the
aspect of lending legitimacy and support to a government that does not deserve it
outweigh the potential impact and influence one might have over the
government’s plans and actions?” (66). This dilemma will be discussed in depth
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in the following chapters, as I argue that neither total autonomy nor total
dependence on the state or political parties is the most effective way to create
change in Nicaragua: it is instead somewhere in the gray area that leads to the
most efficacious relationship.
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Chapter 3:
Re-conceptualizing State-Civil Society Relations:
Liberalism, Corporatism and Cooperation
Introduction
In contemporary analyses of how civil society organizations interact with
the state, two theoretical perspectives are commonly offered: corporatist and
liberal-democratic. The corporatist tradition, with its origins in Ancient Rome,
advocates for an incorporation of key players of society into the state framework
in order to govern most effectively. The liberal tradition, located on the opposite
side of the autonomy spectrum, argues that a wholly autonomous civil society is
necessary in order to be able to externally influence the state. Liberalism and
corporatism fall short of being able to examine civil society and state relationships
on all parts of the autonomy spectrum. They are too rigid and often do not take
into account the unique historical development of Nicaraguan civil society with
regards to the state. By proposing a new perspective on civil society, termed
‘cooperation,’ I transcend past proposals of cooperation and recognize agency for
civil society organizations in the creation of collaborative relationships between
civil society organizations and the Nicaraguan state. This chapter seeks to
explore and define corporatist, liberal and cooperative perspectives so that they
might be applied to my case studies in the following two chapters.
Chart 3.1: The Autonomy Spectrum
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In order to be able to analyze state and civil society relationships, I must
first define civil society. Next, I focus on the corporatist and liberal frameworks.
Although I focus this analysis on the seminal works of Wiarda (2003) and
Diamond (1994), two major scholars of corporatism and liberalism, respectively,
historical perspectives are also offered in this analysis. I then look at alternative
ways to view state and civil society relationships, emphasizing the need to look at
these interactions from non-Western traditions. I offer two examples of nonWestern examples of how civil society and the state interact, focusing on
Participatory Budgeting (PB) in Porto Alegre, Brazil and state-led civil society in
China. The Chinese example is one of corporatism, whereas PB walks the fine
line between corporatism and cooperation. These two cases help to inform my
development of a non-Western cooperative perspective on state-civil society
interactions, which emphasizes partnerships while maintaining a certain degree of
autonomy.
In later chapters of my thesis, taking into account the historical
development of state and civil society relationships in Nicaragua, I argue that it is
a cooperative relationship that is most effective way to make change in
Nicaragua’s difficult climate in which the state continually endeavors to control
civil society. As Wiarda (2003) and Mercer (2002) argue, it is necessary to look at
the distinct historical trajectory and local conditions of civil society and state
interactions, something that I will analyze in further sections of my thesis. This
argument sets the stage for my analysis of two different sectors in Nicaraguan
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civil society, the national anti-water privatization movement and the state-led
formation of Citizen Power Councils (CPCs) in Nicaragua.
Terminology: What is Civil Society?
Civil society is a widely-used term in academia, particularly in
democratization studies. However, looking at civil society solely as a tool for
democratization overlooks and oversimplifies the complex interactions between
state and civil society and how this influences the impact that civil society can
have in a country. Instead, I adopt a definition of civil society that focuses not
only on democratization, but on governance20 and state-society relations. How do
civil society organizations work towards change? They do not always operate in
a democratic framework. In this section, I analyze three different definitions of
civil society.
Diamond (1994) provides a liberal definition of civil society, as he
declares it is “the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating,
(largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order
or a set of shared rules. It is distinct from ‘society’ in general in that it involves
citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions,
and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the
state, and hold state officials accountable” (5). This definition is Western
oriented, and makes some democratic presuppositions about the nature of civil
society.

20

Governance refers to how decisions are being made within a society, focusing on a much
broader group of actors than solely politicians. Governance includes legislators, civil society
members, constituents, and bureaucrats.
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Brysk (2000) also infuses a democratic perspective in her definition of
civil society, arguing for a political role of civil society, which she defines as
“public and political association outside the state… Its political role is not just to
aggregate, represent, and articulate interests, but also to create citizens, to shape
consciousness, and to help define what is public and political” (151). She
envisions citizens who play active roles in determining their interests outside of
the state as key members of civil society organizations.
In his study of Nicaraguan civil society, Borchgrevink (2006) warns
against the implicit or explicit assumptions of civil society as a democratic
concept. He defines civil society as “the associational sector ‘between family,
market and state’…we do not make any a priori conclusions about the character
of the organizations of civil society. We do not, for instance, assume that they are
necessarily promoters of democracy and human rights; united and in agreement;
or counter-poised to the state…” (13-14). After the initial fascination with and
romanticization of civil society by scholars, an academic backlash challenged the
assumptions held by many scholars of civil society as a uniformly positive force
for democratization in society (for a review of this phenomenon, see Mercer
2002). Borchgrevink’s remarks therefore address this scholarly development,
acknowledging the need to study civil society with few pre-conceptions.
All three of these definitions share two key things in common: civil
society is an association of people working outside of the private (in familial or
economic terms) sphere. Furthermore, this association is also formally located
outside of the state apparatus. The extent to which autonomy from the state is
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necessary to be considered as civil society varies from author to author, and is
pivotal in my further research. As Borchgrevink states, it is important to
approach notions of civil society with an open-mind and without preconceptions,
acknowledging that the goals and methods of civil society may correspond with
those of the state. The definitions of Brysk and Diamond super-impose a liberal
democratic perspective on civil society, which does not always apply to civil
society organizations in countries such as Nicaragua. Therefore, I adopt
Borchgrevink’s definition of civil society as voluntary associations that operate
between the state, family and the market. I further posit that, especially in nonWestern countries, civil society should include society that is largely organized by
the state, as long as those organizations are not directly subservient to the state.
This inclusion is essential for analyzing civil society in Nicaragua, a country with
a historical tradition of mass organizations intertwined with the state.
Corporatism
Wiarda (2003) argues that the Romans were the first to use the system of
statist corporatism in administering their empire. Wiarda defines corporatism as
“a system of state-sponsored, state-licensed, state-organized, state-controlled
interest associations; representation and consultation, therefore, are also
corporate, group-centered, or functionally organized, not democratically or by
principle of one person, one vote” (14). The Romans used corporatism to
administer their political program to the empire, relying on the state to organize
society so as to quell possible challenges to their rule.
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Corporatism continued to develop in Europe, gaining momentum during
the Middle Ages as Christian notions of governance diffused throughout Europe,
eventually spreading to Latin America. Christian notions of civil society and state
interaction in the Middle Ages derived from the idea of monarchy and as the king
as a descendant from an omnipotent God. This idea negates the importance of an
autonomous civil society and emphasizes absolutism. If the sovereign is acting as
God incarnate on earth, then he or she do not need the advice of mere mortals to
shape state policies. Other Christians may be invited into a corporatist state
system, which restricts the population which could be part of governance
(Wiarda, 2003, 15-16).
Absolutism, with ideological roots in medieval corporatism, was
expounded on by Rousseau in his writings. If the state organized and controlled
civil society, it therefore was allowed to dictate how much power civil society
organizations would have. Rousseau introduced the idea of the ‘general will’ in
his work, The Social Contract. “Rousseau’s vision was of the instant,
spontaneous eruption of liberty… This explosion of freedom would be led by a
heroic, charismatic leader who presumably knew (without the benefit of elections)
and embodied the troubling concept that Rousseau brought to prominence, the
‘general will’” (Wiarda 19). This idea has continued relevance in the political
systems of Latin American countries today, states Wiarda (2003), and can also be
compared with the Christian notion of a divine leader who has no need for civil
society to influence the formation of the state or policy.
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Rousseau’s concept of a ‘general will’ therefore sees an independent civil
society as unnecessary and as an obstacle to forming a free society that can be led
by the strong leader who can perceive the will of the people and impose it on
them. In Latin America, this leader is known as a caudillo. Wiarda (2003) sees
Rousseau as one of the most influential scholars whose political vision has
influenced Latin America, stating that Rousseau’s
influence today pervades virtually all areas of Latin American political
life that have an effect (largely negative) on the growth (or lack
thereof) of civil society: strong executives, weak legislatures and
courts, weak local government, centralized ministries and an
administrative state rather than a participatory one, absence of checks
and balances, weak societies and limited associational life, and
justifications for ‘strong government’ often at the expense of human
rights (20).
Dictators and authoritarian governments have routinely used Rousseau’s
arguments for justification of their rule. If they represent the best interest of the
people, it seems purposeless for civil society to organize to demand their rights or
to change policy. Civil society actually inhibits the ability of the chosen leader to
govern in Rousseau’s vision of liberty and the state.
How does corporatism fit into perceptions of Nicaraguan civil society? In
Nicaragua, the Somoza dynasty and the Sandinista Revolution both used
corporatist methods in their interactions with civil society. As described in
Chapter 2, the Somoza dynasty relied on state-organized civil society to add
legitimacy to their regime. The Somozas were eventually defeated due to citizen
organizing outside of the state, as Nicaraguans began to organize in guerrilla
movements such as the FSLN. In order to achieve the stated goal of creating a
more egalitarian, socialist society, the FSLN continued to organize citizens from
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within the state framework after taking power in 1979. In the 1980s civil society
was largely comprised of members of the FSLN (National Sandinista Liberation
Front). The party portrayed themselves as the vanguard of the revolution, which
influenced how they interacted with civil society organizations. Many were
officially affiliated with the FSLN, because if the party is “the legitimate leader of
the revolutionary process, [this means] that these organizations were subordinated
to the FSLN… in the corporative Sandinista model, the lines between state, party
and mass organizations were blurred, while authority lay unquestioningly with the
party and its centralized decision-making structure” (Borchgrevink, 2006, 18).
This was an example of a socialist party attempting to control civil society so as
to further the cause of the revolution.
This corporatist perspective on how the state should interact with civil
society limited the actions of the mass civil society organizations, particularly in
the difficult context of the contra war. During the late 1980s, the Sandinista
government leaned heavily on the corporatist organizational structures to bolster
support for the FSLN and its governing project, even given the violent war and
high inflation rate. Providing support and legitimacy to the government meant
that community organizations were not allowed to act independently for change,
and instead were tied to the desires of the state. Limitations bred discontent
among the mass organizations, with many declaring autonomy from the FSLN in
the last years of the revolutionary experiment and after the election of Violeta
Chamorro in 1990.
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Daniel Ortega, since his presidential re-election in 2006 until 2008,
adopted a corporatist perspective on state-civil society relations in Nicaragua,
similar to his perspective during the revolution. He used the state as an
instrument to organize civil society organizations. This continued reliance, once
again, on corporatism by an FSLN government has perpetuated the alienation felt
by certain segments of the Nicaraguan civil society organizations, specifically
those which are leftist but are not allied with the FSLN party or government.
Ortega, in his second term as president, continued to fear and distrust an
independent civil society.
Why does corporatism continue to have relevance in Latin America?
“Corporatism appeared to present an alternative… given the unacceptability
(Marxism) or failure (liberalism) of the other options” (Wiarda, 2003, 93) for the
elites. It permitted the elites to continue governing, even under changing societal,
political and economic circumstances, and was able to incorporate new groups or
organizations (here perceived as ‘corporations’) into the governing structure.
These new organizations were allowed some power in the state structure after
they demonstrated that they were a powerful group and could threaten the
political structure. But upon incorporation into the state structure, these new
corporations entered into an implicit contract that they would abide by the states’
wishes and would not challenge the legitimacy of the state (94).
Wiarda (2003) challenges the applicability of the liberal democratic
perspective about the United States to other countries and regions in the light of
these historical incorporation strategies: “Latin American social and political
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processes consisted as the constant addition of new corporate groups… to the
political process” controlled by the elite and the state. “The vertical and
segmented corporatist structures, the absence of genuine democracy and
egalitarianism, the patron-client system of politics, and the absence of consensus
on the fundamental ends of politics” are all reasons why the liberal-democratic
perspective may pose governance concerns in Latin America. Wiarda identifies
key processes that must be in place for the incorporation of new corporate groups
to enact democratic change in society, and argues that Latin America does not
have many of these existing factors. Therefore, those factors serve as structural
constraints on how civil society can organize and act.
The corporatist tradition has also been embraced in other parts of the
world. China has had a lengthy tradition of corporatism. Frolic (1997) argues that
the historical state development in China led to the formation of what he terms
state-led civil society. “State-led civil society is a form of corporatism. The state
determines which organizations are legitimate and forms an unequal partnership
with them. The state does not dominate directly. It leaves some degree of
autonomy to these organizations, but it does demand a disciplined partnership
base on cooperation…” (58). China’s political society was dominated by a single
political party. The Communists attempted have a party-led society, and therefore
co-opted autonomous forms of organization. What the state neglected to take into
account was “the state-civil society relation is not a zero sum; an increase of civil
society does not necessitate a reduced role for the state” (219).
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Instead, the Chinese state endeavored to control of civil society
organizations to prevent them from losing power. When the goals of the civil
society organization and the state are closely aligned, a close relationship can be
beneficial to both groups involved in the partnership. When “[t]he state seeks to
co-opt spontaneous organisations and channel them towards serving its own
interests; problems arise when a gap develops between the interests of the state
and the interests of the grass-roots organisation” (Flower & Leonard 1996, 204).
Flower & Leonard comment that Chinese farmers are reluctant to enter into a
partnership with state-led civil society not because reluctance to owe something to
the state, but instead because they believe that the state will not fulfill its promise
in the partnership (206).
This lack of faith in the accountability of the state to its people creates a
situation in which citizens are hesitant to partner with the state. The state is seen
as in a position to take advantage of civil society. In the post-Cold War epoch,
discourse often “casts civil society in the role of David against the Goliath of the
modern state” (Hann 1996, 6). In the case of Nicaragua, the lack of
accountability is shown in the co-optation of the RNDC. When Ruth Herrera was
appointed president of ENACAL, Ortega and Herrera both pledged to prevent
water privatization from ever occurring in Nicaragua. The General National
Water Law (LGAN) that was passed in 2007 technically prohibits the
privatization of water service, but does not prevent the privatization of water
sources nor does it define water privatization. Many actors in civil society believe
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that privatization is still a possibility under the LGAN, a claim that will be put
forth in Chapter 4.
Liberalism
The liberal-democratic perspective on state and civil society relations
posits itself in sharp contrast to the corporatist perspective. Instead of viewing
civil society as a social entity that exists either within the state structure or to
support that structure, liberalism sees the autonomy of civil society as key to a
positive relationship between civil society organizations and the state. This
autonomy is prioritized above all other characteristics.
De Tocqueville was one of the first authors to write on state and civil
society relations from the liberal tradition. De Tocqueville, in Democracy in
America, posited that good governance stems from independent civil society
associations that represent citizen’s interests. De Tocqueville argued in favor of
associational democracy that would unite citizens from diverse backgrounds and
supercede personal interests. De Tocqueville interpreted the America that he
encountered as comprised of strong
“intermediate associations or civil society… groups that lie
between the individual and the state, that serve as transmission
belts for conveying private interest concerns to government
decision makers and back down again as implementers of public
policy, that help to mediate between state and citizen, and that
serve both as expressions of popular sentiment and as limits on
arbitrary government” (Wiarda, 2003, 21).
These associations retain independence from the state and are able to
communicate the will of the American people to the American government. The
liberal tradition of how to view civil society and its independence from the state
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was developed in a Western mindset, and frequently saw the American civic
tradition as the idealized standard for how the state should interact with civil
society.
What are the mechanisms in which governance is improved? Diamond
(1994) reflects on De Tocqueville, writing, “By enhancing the accountability,
responsiveness, inclusiveness, effectiveness, and hence legitimacy of the political
system, a vigorous civil society gives citizens respect for the state and positive
engagement with it. In the end, this improves the ability of the state to govern”
(11). Civil society organizations, in their location outside of the state, are able to
better pressure the government into representing the people, according to the
liberal democratic perspective.
A second key author on civil society and state interactions in the liberaldemocratic tradition is Habermas, who also emphasized the importance of
autonomy and independence from the state of civil society institutions. Habermas
envisioned civil society as comprised of “educated actors who gain influence, but
not political power, in the public sphere.” These actors are responsible for
“influencing politics via communicative action” (Novy & Leubolt, 2005, 2024).
Habermas wrote that educated private citizens should interact with the state in
engaging the state and other private citizens “in a debate over the general rules
governing relations” in an increasingly commodified world (Habermas, 1962, 27).
This liberal vision is exclusionary, as it allows for only a small sub-section of the
population to participate in lobbying the state. It also presupposes that only
informed and well-educated citizens deserve to organize for their interests. This
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is tied to concerns that Nicaraguan civil society has become too professionalized
and ‘NGO-ized.’21
Since De Tocqueville, the liberal perspective on state and civil society
relationships has evolved, but still maintains a Western-centrist perspective.
Larry Diamond (1994) has continued to develop the liberal democratic
perspective on civil society, seeing civil society as an autonomous entity that
engages the state in order to facilitate a more democratic form of government. In
his analysis, civil society is not only independent from the state and society as a
whole; it is also independent from the party system. This autonomy is essential,
Diamond argues, in order for civil society to provide a limit on state power and to
“supplement[] the role of political parties in stimulating political participation,
increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens, and promoting an
appreciation of the obligations as well as the rights of democratic citizenship” (78).
Again, this infuses a democratic perspective on civil society. Nicaragua
does not have a rich democratic tradition, in sharp contrast to the United States,
and instead has a history of dictatorship, corporatism, party-dominated states and
civil war. The first democratic election in Nicaragua was not until 1984.
Diamond acknowledged this concern, stating
corporatist arrangements pose a serious threat to democracy in
transitional or newly emerging constitutional regimes. The risk
appears greatest in countries with a history of authoritarian state
corporatism… where the state created, organized, licensed,
funded, subordinated, and controlled ‘interest’ groups… with a
view to cooptation, repression, and domination rather than ordered
bargaining. By contrast, the transition to a democratic form of
21

For a discussion on the NGO-ization of Nicaraguan civil society, see Borchgrevink 2006.
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corporatism ‘seems to depend very much on a liberal-democratic
past,’ which most developing… states lack (13).
Is it possible that Nicaraguan civil society doesn’t have the historical
background to effectively use a liberal-democratic framework to view the
state and civil society relations?
Diamond (1994) described a variety of characteristics that a liberaldemocratic civil society should have, and here I briefly mention those which
impact the relationship that civil society should have with the state. A critical
function of civil society is that it is an entity involved in “recruiting and training
new political leaders” (9). This can be problematic when the people involved in
civil society organizations, as observed in Chapter 2, were formerly political
leaders in the 1980s. Furthermore, as the case of Ruth Herrera of the RNDC will
illustrate in Chapter 4, sometimes the leaders of civil society organizations are
actually incorporated into the state in a corporatist, often non-democratic way.
Diamond ends his discussion on the functions of a democratic civil society
by reflecting on De Tocqueville: “‘Freedom of association,’ De Tocqueville
mused, may, ‘after having agitated society for some time… strengthen the state in
the end’” (11). Is Nicaragua ready to allow civil society organizations to agitate
society and politics? The liberal presidents (1990-2006) often viewed civil
society organizations with mistrust and fear. Because of this, they endeavored to
isolate civil society and dictate the terms in which civil society could organize and
interact with the state. Under a liberal president, only autonomous organizations
stood a chance to interact with the government, yet even then the politicians
would often ignore their demands.
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Civil society is also proposed as supplementing “the role of political
parties in stimulating political participation… [and] creating channels other than
the political parties for the articulation, aggregation and representation of
interests” (Diamond, 1994, 7-8). Grigsby (2007) argues that Ortega has created
the CPCs as part of the Sandinista party in order to stream-line political
participation into the party structure, instead of to make an independent, nonpartisan civil society that would work to further democratize the state. Although
the CPCs buttress the party structure, “Interest groups cannot substitute for
coherent political parties with broad and relatively enduring bases of popular
support” (Diamond, 1994, 15).
Diamond (1994) further prioritizes the importance of having a pluralistic,
competitive and internally democratic civil society. President Ortega has set up
as the CPCs as the only legitimate form of civil participation, telling crowds:
“‘The only civil society is the CPCs, the only civil society is the Sandinistas
gathered here,’” (Equipo Nitlapán 2008a, 4). Some CPCs have tried to close
other civil society organizations out of politics to eliminate competition for citizen
support (Malishchak, 2008). This eliminates pluralism in civil society, and
severely challenges the democratic nature of civil society in Nicaragua.
Alternative Interactions of the State and Civil Society
Hellman (1992) argues that Western theorists romanticize the importance
of autonomy when looking at social movements, which she refers to as the
“Fetishism of Autonomy” (54). Hellman acknowledges that civil society and
social movements often perceive political parties to be only interested in their
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issues “only insofar as they can manipulate these movements for their own
partisan ends. Movement activists accuse the parties… of feeding off their
popular support, sapping the movements’ strength in an effort to reinforce the
traditional leftist forces’ faltering positions” (53).22
Hellman emphasizes that cooperation and coordination between the state
and civil society or social movements may signify the success of a cause instead
of the compromise of its integrity. She believes that the goals of a movement can
be realized when the movement merges with the state or a politician who creates
policies that support the goals of the movement. The appointment of Ruth
Herrera to head ENACAL therefore would be interpreted by Hellman as a victory
for the movement, since now someone in power represents the interests of the
diverse group of people who united to fight against water privatization.
The ‘Fetishism of Autonomy’ can be further explored while looking at
practical examples of state and civil society relationships. In her literature review
of how civil society is associated with democratization, Mercer (2002) states,
“while state and civil society are often dichotomized, much of the empirical
evidence actually points to the interweaving of the two” (12). Can a balance
between valuing autonomy without fetishizing it exist in a partnership with state
and civil society organizations? I argue that it is possible and most advantageous
for civil society organizations to value a degree of autonomy. However, in order
to work with the state, they may need to give up some of that autonomy and
recognize that, in doing so, they may be better able to work for change.

22

This addresses the claim put forth by Grigsby (2007) in Chapter 5, which asserts the FSLN is
only interested in fortifying civil society to further its own political position.
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One example of this interconnectedness noted by Mercer (2002) between
the state and civil society is found in the system of participatory budgeting (PB)
that was started in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in the late 1980s. PB does not fit in
neatly into the cookie-cutter definitions of corporatism nor liberalism. For a
partnership such as PB, it is necessary to develop a third category: that of
cooperation.
Novy and Leubolt (2005) argue that “PB is a social innovation that
emerged from an intertwined process involving the state and civil society” (2023).
Novy and Leubolt argue that this intertwined process stems from the history of
Brazil: founded by the Portuguese patrimonial state, the relationship between state
and civil society developed as one of clientelism.23 This historical development
led to a closed political system in which segments not associated with the state
were excluded from power and access to the state (Novy 2001, in Novy &
Leubolt 2005). Fiori (1995) argues that “the autonomy of civil society has been
quite limited, as the strengths or weaknesses of civic organisations have been
based on the ability to control of the state apparatus” (Novy & Leubolt, 2005,
2025). Civil society was strengthened during growing opposition to the military
dictatorship in the 1970s and early 1980s. Civil society was attributed to have a
significant impact on the democratization of Brazil through a growing number of
social movements. These social movements were important in that they were led
by the popular masses and were largely organized around local demands (Novy &
Leubolt, 2005, 2025-6).

23

Defined here as the a political system “in which politicians and clients exchange favors” (Novy
& Leubolt, 2005, 2025).
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It was out of this political tradition that PB arose. In 1988, the Workers’
Party (PT) won the mayor’s office in Porto Alegre, Brazil. In the same year, a
new constitution was formed that decentralized some budgeting decisions and
gave municipalities increased responsibilities. Novy and Leubolt (2005, 2028)
claim that PB replaced “clientelism with open and transparent discussion” and led
to the creation of a system in which civil society participated in sessions with the
government to best determine how to spend the budget in Porto Alegre. It was
heralded as making the state more responsive to the needs of diverse group of
Brazilians, while also democratizing and moderating civil society in Porto Alegre.
By providing an opportunity for cooperation, civil society was unable to solely
criticize the state, but was encouraged to work in conjunction with the state to
solve the problems of Porto Alegre. Novy and Leubolt (2005, 2030) assert that
PB increased solidarity and civic consciousness while becoming a “‘school for
democracy.’” It was proposed as a direct challenge to the traditional system of
clientelism and corruption often associated with Brazilian politics.
How can we apply this case to further the investigation about Nicaragua?
I think that PB and the CPCs share some important characteristics and
differences. CPCs have also been proposed as a way to incorporate citizens into
issues of local governance such as budgeting. They are heralded by Ortega as a
way to connect citizens to the state and to hold the government more accountable
to citizens’ demands. In reality, however, the CPCs are not transparent.
Furthermore, their detractors firmly state that CPCs lead to increased clientelism
since they are responsible for distributing several government programs, such as
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subsidized food and fertilizer. Baltodano (2007) argues that the promise of favors
such as cheaper beans or job offers cause people to be involved in their CPCs: in
many cases it has become a rule that you must have a recommendation from the
CPC in your neighborhood to apply for any government or municipal job.
Novy and Leubolt (2005) offer a caveat about participatory budgeting at
the end of their article, acknowledging that PB was originally instrumental in
democratizing the state and decision making at a local level, but that in recent
years less people are participating in the process, and those who participate have
lost some enthusiasm (2032). The novelty has worn off. The “co-government
role” that civil society and local government had shared (Gret and Sintomer,
2002) was severely weakened after the PT lost the municipal elections in 2004,
revealing the partisanship nature of PB and nature of PB as something that was
tied to a single political party, instead of institutionalized into the local state
government structure. Accusations that the CPCs were partisan and worked only
with the FSLN were rampant in Nicaragua (Equipo Nitlapán 2007a). These
partisan claims can help to explain why so many scholars fetishize autonomy:
they fear that an organization will become too closely aligned with a political
party and will be unable to work for change if that party is in power or comes into
power.
Even with these caveats, the case of PB is illustrative of one example of
cooperation between the state and civil society in Latin America. It shows how
civil society can link civil society with the state and become the so-called
“transmission belts” (Wiarda, 2003, 21) for connecting the needs of the people
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with the state apparatus. If scholars can move beyond the “Fetishism of
Autonomy” (Hellman, 1992), they are able to analyze new social movements and
civil society innovations to allow for the fact that linking civil society and the
state does not always spell ruin for a cause. In the case of Porto Alegre, bringing
together civil society and the state actually led to increased power of citizens
during the years it was effective.
The framing by Novy and Leubolt of PB supercedes traditional
conceptions of corporatism. In the late 1980s, Brazil was finally leaving behind
its past of military dictatorship, and a strong and independent civil society with
extraordinary demands might have destabilized the fledgling democracy. Novy
and Leubolt (2005) argue that by incorporating civil society into the state, this
forced civil society organizations to moderate their views and participate in
negotiation with the state instead of being openly confrontational (2030). A
strong and independent civil society in a new democracy might undermine
democracy in the country, and a strong state (supported explicitly by civil society)
may be necessary to transition out of a military dictatorship and into democracy.
Diamond’s liberal democratic perspective is here employed to contrast the
conceptions of liberalism and corporatism. Diamond (1994) argues that “civil
society organizations seek from the state concessions, benefits, policy changes,
relief, redress or accountability” (6). The civil society organizations involved in
PB are therefore attempting to hold the government accountable for budgeting
decisions and attempting to seek relief from their poverty by spending the budget
in a way to develop community.
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Diamond (1994) cautions against too much collaboration between civil society
and the state.
Using Diamond’s construction of state and civil society relations, one
could argue that civil society in Brazil was too closely interconnected with the
state. The PB process was closely tied to the Worker’s Party in Brazil, and
largely incorporated into the state structure. So although citizens were involved
in budgeting decisions, they may have ceased to be able to lobby the government
for changes in other areas of political life. For example, Novy and Leubolt (2005)
acknowledge that PB only related to how the budget was spent, not focusing on
changing the way in which revenue was collected. By appeasing the masses by
allowing them to have input on how to spend the budget, was the state preventing
civil society from attempting to overhaul the system of revenues to push for more
social equality in Brazil (2032). Giving concessions to civil society, however
meaningful, may prevent civil society organizations from organizing for more
radical changes in society. With both of these analyses, it is apparent that PB
does not neatly fit into either the corporatist or liberal relationships between civil
society and the state. Instead, although initially organized by the state, PB
allowed for collaboration between state and members of civil society, in a
cooperative framework.
Cooperation
Brinkerhoff (1999) argues that state and civil society can enter into
successful partnerships in developing countries to coordinate programs and
policies. He argues that “from an instrumental/technical viewpoint, state-society
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partnerships make sense” (83) but acknowledges that it can be challenging to
“keep the process on track when various interest groups seek to bend (or in some
instances hijack) the process to fit their particular purposes” (77). In order for a
successful partnership to happen, there needed to be high levels of trust between
the state and civil society, and in Nicaragua this trust did not exist fully from
either side. Civil society distrusted the state and accused the state of co-opting
movements, organizations and key actors (such as Ruth Herrera). The Sandinistadominated state, in turn, distrusted civil society and saw it as trying to destabilize
the state and the FSLN.
When successful, Brinkerhoff (1999) believes that “state-civil society
partnerships can potentially fulfill a broader function of promoting more
responsive, transparent, and accountable government” (83). In order to better
coordinate state and civil society partnerships, Brinkerhoff places the burden of
responsibility with the state. His policy recommendations include government
decentralization and the establishment of a strong legal framework to enable civil
society organizations to work with the state, yet allows the organizations to
maintain their independence. In Nicaragua, it appears as if the government is
unwilling to respect this legal framework after Daniel Ortega used a presidential
decree to over-ride the democratically approved Law 475: Law of Citizen
Participation.24 Furthermore, the current Ortega administration has been accused
of centralizing power instead of devolving it to the municipalities (Grigsby,
2007).
24

This law was designed to create CONPES at a national level and other citizen groups at
municipal and community levels. Ortega over-rode the law by creating the CPC structure by
presidential decree in 2007.
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Although Brinkerhoff’s analysis is important, I believe that instead of
prioritizing the state role, civil society organizations must be seen as having
agency to initiate successful, cooperative partnerships. If the state is unwilling to
initiate cooperative ventures with civil society organizations that supercede
traditions of corporatism, then it is up to civil society organizations to engage with
the state and establish boundaries that guarantee them some degree of autonomy
while ensuring that they do not become isolated from the state. Organizations that
over-value autonomy are often excluded from the state through vertical isolation.
This may also exclude them from horizontal partnerships with corporatist or
cooperative organizations. Corporatist organizations are horizontally isolated
from other civil society organizations. Cooperative organizations can facilitate
both vertical and horizontal integration, as they are not isolated from the state or
other civil society organizations. The work and actions of the CODA, a case that
will be analyzed in greater detail in Chapter 4, is an example of a cooperative
relationship between civil society and the Nicaraguan state. The CODA initiated
and defined the partnership, even with the state attempting to control the coalition.
Conclusion
In this paper, I define a cooperative relationship between the state and
civil society as a relationship in which the state and civil society partner with each
other to work for change, where civil society organizations have maintained
enough autonomy to be able to pressure the state—constructively—for change if
they perceive this to be necessary. However, the civil society organizations must
not be too independent from the state: they must be wiling to engage with the
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state and work in collaboration with the state. In this definition, the agency of
civil society organizations is recognized in examining how they to decide how to
interact with the state. Cooperative relationships, from the perspective of civil
society, can occur even with a state that usually adopts a corporatist or liberaldemocratic perspective towards civil society.
Corporatist and liberal perspectives have traditionally focused on how the
state chooses to interact with civil society. They are narrowly focused and may
deny the recognition of agency to the civil society organizations and the citizens,
who make up an important part of the equation. Although structural and
historical constraints act upon civil society organizations, there are often
opportunities to engage in cooperative relationships. These relationships will
differ in countries which have unique political traditions and ways in which to
view the relationship between the state and civil society organizations. Both the
state and civil society organizations must recognize those unique conditions and
work within the framework, even though the civil society organizations may
challenge the historical interpretations of how civil society organizations ought to
interact with the state. With the case of PB in Porto Alegre, the creation of
institutions to allow citizens to participate in the budgeting allocation process
transcended the authoritarian and corporatist Brazilian past.
Corporatism, with roots in ancient Rome, is a relationship in which civil
society is largely organized, controlled and directed by the state apparatus,
ostensibly to allow for citizen input into state policies. In many situations,
corporatism has been used in authoritarian governments in an attempt to control
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society. Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas have used corporatist interpretations
of state-civil society relationships in Nicaragua in their relationships with many
civil society organizations. The FSLN has created state-led civil society to garner
support for their revolutionary political project, and to better organize the state.
They have used corporatist relationships in attempts silence demands from civil
society over water privatization, as Ortega promoted Ruth Herrera, head of a
major civil society organization, to head the state-owned water company and stop
water privatization, without creating a strong enough legal standard to guarantee
that water privatization is off the table for Nicaragua. In 2006, Ortega announced
the creation of the CPCs; citizen committees which would be able to organize to
bring demands to the government. Accusations that the CPCs are corporatist
bodies will be evaluated and confirmed in Chapter 5.
On the other end of the state-civil society relationship spectrum is
liberalism. The liberal perspective emphasizes that civil society organizations
need to be autonomous from the state in order to most effectively enact change.
The liberal perspective, born out of the American democratic past, projects a
Western, democracy-oriented vision of civil society onto other countries. In
Nicaragua, a series of three liberal presidents governed from 1990-2006, and each
adopted the liberal-democratic perspective. They created legal frameworks to
professionalize civil society organizations. Some organizations, out of fear that
the state would co-opt their organization or not hold up their side of the
partnership, became too autonomous. This overly autonomous perspective
isolated them from the state and did not allow them to constructively partner with
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the state. Chapter 4 further explains this phenomenon with regards to the
Nicaraguan Communal Movement (MCN).
It is organizations that negotiate a cooperative partnership with the state,
such as the CODA, that are most successful in working towards change in
Nicaragua. Recognizing the agency of the civil society organizations, this
framework argues that civil society organizations can undertake certain actions
and use certain frameworks in order to engage the state without becoming a part
of it, and to maintain a certain degree of autonomy without alienating themselves
from the state. In the following chapter, these three perspectives: corporatist,
liberal-democratic, and cooperative are further explored with relationship to three
national organizations that worked against water privatization in Nicaragua.
Chapter 5 continues this analysis by focusing on the corporatist tradition and the
legacy of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
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Chapter 4:
Co-optation, Separation and Cooperation: Water Privatization in Nicaragua
Introduction
In Nicaragua, the state has often been accused of taking advantage of civil
society organizations to maintain and enhance its power. Since the late 1980s,
and accelerating with the 1990 electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, civil society
organizations have increasingly asserted their independence from the Nicaraguan
state. In order to examine how the independence of civil society organizations
influences the impact these organizations can have on societal change in
Nicaragua, I have selected the case of the anti-water privatization movement to
examine.
In Nicaragua, there have been three different groups that have been the
key players in the fight against water privatization: the National Consumer’s
Defense Network (RNDC), the Nicaraguan Communal Movement (MCN) and the
Coalition of Organizations for Water Rights (CODA). Each of these
organizations has had a unique relationship with the Nicaraguan state. The
RNDC was closely affiliated with the state after President Daniel Ortega selected
the then-president of the Network, Ruth Herrera, to lead the state-run water
company, ENACAL25, in 2006. The MCN is a fully autonomous organization in
Nicaragua, with no ties to the state or political parties, as of 2008. The CODA is
a coalition of diverse groups in civil society that worked with the state on water
issues, attempted to cultivate ties to politicians, yet also valued its independence
and challenged governmental policy.
25

Nicaraguan Aqueduct and Sanitary Sewer System
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I propose that when organizations work too closely with the state, such as
the case of the RNDC, or too isolated from it, such as the case of the MCN, this
relationship limits the possibilities that civil society organizations had to work for
societal change in Nicaragua. Instead, organizations such as the CODA, which
works with the state while maintaining independency, are most effective in
organizing in Nicaragua, in this case against water privatization. Below is a chart
that demonstrates where each of the organizations lies on the autonomy spectrum,
first introduced in Chapter 3.
Chart 4.1: Water Rights Organizations Located on the Autonomy Spectrum

In this chapter, I first give a history of water privatization in Nicaragua.
Next, I analyze the three organizations and their relationship with the Nicaraguan
state, focusing on how those relationships impact the tactics and strategies of the
organizations. I argue that since the RNDC worked closely with the state,
allegations of co-optation of the movement surfaced. Futhermore, thoughts of
victory demobilized some RNDC members. The complete autonomy of the MCN
threatened the Nicaraguan state and positioned the Movement in an inherently
conflictive stance with the state. The CODA was more successful because it
provided a ‘checks and balances’ role to the state, constructed a dialogue with the
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state, and constructively criticized state actions, without threatening the apparatus
of the state.
History of Water Privatization in Nicaragua
In 2002, the United Nations (UN) declared access to affordable potable
water a fundamental human right, announcing “Water is a limited natural resource
and a public good fundamental for life and health. The human right to water is
indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the
realization of other human rights… The human right to water entitles everyone to
sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for
personal and domestic uses” (United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 2002). According to UNICEF (2004) statistics, 21% of the
Nicaraguan population does not have a reliable potable water source, as the
government does not yet provide this essential resource and basis of life to over
one-fifth of Nicaraguans. The United Nations Millennium Goals aim to “reduce
by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water”
by 2015. To comply with the UN Millennium Goals, 83.5% of Nicaraguans
should have access to potable water by 2015.
Nicaragua is a water-rich country, unlike some of its Central American
neighbors. Lake Cocibolca26 is the largest tropical lake in the Western
Hemisphere, with a surface area comparable to that of Puerto Rico. Professor
Salvador Montenegro (2008), of the Center of Water Resources Studies at the
National Autonomous University in Managua, has calculated that each

26

Lake Nicaragua, to foreigners.
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Nicaraguan has at their disposal 106,265 liters of water per person, per day, if all
of the water in Nicaragua was to be used.
So why is water, a basic human right, not being provided 21 percent of the
5.6 million citizens of Nicaragua? Part of the problem, Montenegro (2008)
explains, is geographic.27 But the majority of the lack of water service can be
explained with analyzing political and economic contexts. The 1990s brought the
arrival of neoliberal reforms to post-revolutionary Nicaragua. One of the basic
tenets of neoliberalism argues that the state is an inefficient provider of services to
the populace, and that the central government should privatize essential services,
such as water, to allow for a more efficient and effective distribution of these
services (Morales 2008). Many civil society organizations and networks
disagreed and have organized the Nicaraguan populace in opposition to the forces
of neoliberalism, specifically the privatization of water. In order to analyze
current movements against water privatization, it is essential to explain the history
of water privatization in Nicaragua.
Water service in Nicaragua has alternated between decentralized and
centralized administration in the last seventy years. According to the manager of
Water Company of Matagalpa (AMAT), Engineer Noel Amador, the Somoza
family dynasty (1934-1979) put water service in the hands of municipal
governments. Once the Sandinista Revolution triumphed in 1979, the water
system in Nicaragua was centralized and became under the administration of the
27

“86% of the Nicaraguan population lives on 20% of the territory, which contains only 6% of the
water resources of Nicaragua.” Indeed, much of the water resources in Nicaragua are found in the
two big lakes, Lake Cocibolca and Lake Xolotlán (Lake Managua to foreigners) or on the
Caribbean Coast, which encompasses half of the territory but represents only 10% of the
population.
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INAA (Nicaraguan Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers). In 1990, Violeta
Chamorro was elected president and began to advocate for decentralization of the
water system. In 1991, the first decentralization took place: water service in
Matagalpa and Jinotega, two northern departments, was legally devolved to the
office of the mayor. In this way water service remained the responsibility of state
companies, but with local administration. Over time, Amador (2008) admitted,
these companies became increasingly independent.
With the election of Arnoldo Alemán as president in 1997, the
restructuring of the water service in Nicaragua was accelerated. In 1998, a plan
supported by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) divided INAA to
create a new state company: Nicaraguan Aqueducts and Sanitary Sewer Company
(ENACAL). ENACAL became the state company in charge of operation of
infrastructure, whereas INAA changed its role to become an independent
regulator. To recuperate the costs of the restructuring, the prices of water service
in Nicaragua increased (List 2002, 9). This decision to separate the functions of
INAA was largely seen as yet another step to prepare Nicaraguan water for
privatization.28

28

Water was not the only service that Aleman was determined to privatize. In 2000, ENEL, the
state-run Nicaraguan Electricity Company, was decentralized into four companies, two of which
were sold to Unión FENOSA, a Spanish multinational corporation, for the sum of $115 million
(List 2002, 7). In 2001, forty percent of the state telecommunications company ENITEL was also
sold off. The Nicaraguan people were determined to not let the same fate befall the distribution of
potable water. Maura Morales of the Consumer Defense League of Nicaragua (LIDECONIC)
stated that the experience the citizens had with opposing the privatization of electricity made them
“reclaim consciousness and protest more so that water would not be privatized.” Several of the
members of civil society I talked to during my research in Nicaragua echoed her words, stating:
“We can live without electricity, but without water it is impossible to live” (2008).
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In 1999, the IBD proposed a massive loan to Nicaragua to modernize
ENACAL, the newly created state company.29 This movement toward
privatization sparked public protests, which continued off-and-on for the next
nine years. The protests intensified after the government announced in June 2001
the country would suffer a 30 percent national increase in water tariffs after
massive pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to recoup the costs
of this so-called modernization reform (Hall & Lobina 2002, 24).
The actions of civil society prompted the National Assembly to pass Law
440 in 2003, even after significant opposition from President Enrique Bolaños,
who threatened a veto of the law. Entitled “Law of Suspension of the
Concessions of Water Use,” the law suspended the proposed sale of
HIDROGESA, the state hydroelectric company, and put a moratorium on the sale
or concessions of companies involved in the service of water until a national
water law could be passed (List 2002, 22). It also created an obstacle to further
privatize water service, as Article 2 of the Law reads, “The award of any
concession related to the facilities and goods of ENACAL or administrative
contracts are suspended” (National Assembly 2002).
Water privatization appeared to be prohibited in Nicaragua with the
passage of Law 440, but in 2005, the Bolaños administration invited a Chilean

29

“The Inter-American Development Bank has promised to lend US$14 million [with additional
funds of $31 million from other international institutions (Hall & Lobina 2002, 23)] if the
government negotiates contracts with a water multinational ‘to provide specific upgrading services
to ENACAL in Managua and to fully manage the water utilities in Leon and Chinandega,’” (two
departments in northwest Nicaragua (IDB 1999). The IDB writes that the program mandated by
this loan “will develop a step-by-step strategy to gradually promote greater private sector
participation in providing water and sanitation services. The service/management contract with a
private operator will facilitate in the medium term greater private sector participation in the
sector…” (1999).
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multi-national firm to administrate ENACAL. “On October 31st of [2005], the
Chilean consortium Inecom Invertec took over administrative control of
ENACAL… According to the IDB and the Nicaraguan government, Inecom has
the role of a consultant to help ‘modernize’ Nicaragua's state water company.
However, many civil society groups contend that this is an illegal masked
privatization and a blatant violation of Nicaraguan Law 440” (Witness for Peace
2006). Civil society once again took up the fight against water privatization.
From 2005 to 2006, civil society sensed the greatest threat to water
privatization. Therefore, it corresponds that these two years saw the most
political action by civil society organizations to prohibit water privatization (Pérez
2008). After the passage of Law 440 in 2003, the next step for the government
was to create a water resources law that clearly states what the water policy of the
government will be. Therefore, during these tumultuous years, the national
assembly was busy debating and crafting a national water law. Civil society
organized to ensure their interests were being properly represented in the National
Assembly. The 2006 elections occurred before a law was passed.
The 2006 presidential elections pitted Daniel Ortega, former Sandinista
president from 1984-1990, against two liberal candidates: Eduardo Montealgre
(ALN- National Liberal Alliance) and José Rizo (PLC- Constitutionalist Liberal
Party). Ortega ran on an anti-privatization platform (Pérez Leiva 2008) and won
in the first round, receiving 38 percent of the vote.30

30

Due to electoral changes mandated by el pacto, this percentage was enough to win him the
presidency, since the next-closest candidate, Montealegre, received 28 percent of the vote.

68

In December of 2006 Ortega chose Ruth Herrera of the National
Consumer Defense Network (RNDC) to become the head of ENACAL. She
“took over a state-owned water company that was being systematically looted in
preparation its privatization. Herrera stopped the privatization, cancelled a
‘modernization’ contract funded with an Inter-American Development Bank loan,
reorganized corrupt employees out of a job” and in doing so frustrated the liberal
deputies in the National Assembly, who lobbied unsuccessfully for her removal as
the Executive President of ENACAL (NicaNet 2007). However, several actors in
civil society believed that Ruth Herrera had been co-opted by becoming part of
the government, and that her politics had changed as a member of the FSLN
government, and alleged that she represented the policies of the Sandinista
government instead of the rights of the people. The role and strategies of the
RNDC will be further analyzed in this chapter.
During Ruth Herrera’s tenure as President of ENACAL, the National
Assembly passed Law 620: National General Water Law (LGAN) on September
9, 2007. In the first pre-article, the law states: “the natural water resource is the
patrimony of the National, and as is it corresponds that the State should promote
the economic and social development by ways of conservation and sustainable
use and development, preventing that it be the object of any type of privatization”
(1).31 What is problematic about this phrase is that privatization is never defined
in the Law, even though Article 12 lists the definitions of other important terms in
the Law.

31

All quotes from Laws are translated by author.
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Article 4 was the most cited article of the Law in my meetings with
representatives from civil society while in Nicaragua. It reads: “The service of
potable water will not be the object of any form of privatization, direct or indirect,
and will be always considered of a public nature. Its administration, surveillance
and control will be placed as the responsibility and under the control of the state
and through the created institutions in this law or those that may be created in the
future” (4). Some people I interviewed told me that this is a complete moratorium
on all privatization in Nicaragua, and that the threat of privatization has passed
(Amador 2008). The majority disagreed and emphasized that the law specifically
disallows for the privatization of potable water service and says nothing against
privatizing the water sources or hydroelectricity in the country. Furthermore,
concessions are not made illegal under this law, which many claim to be
essentially privatization of water service. Trying to make changes to this law was
the most important rallying point for many Nicaraguan civil society organizations
by 2008, fitting with the trend of legal advocacy explained in Chapter 2.
Mobilization existed on many levels of Nicaraguan society against the
continued threat of water privatization by 2008. Some organizations worked on a
Central American level to oppose free trade agreements for the region that allow
for water privatization.32 Others are organizing in their respective departments to
work for water rights at a local level.33 In this chapter, I have chosen to focus on
three groups that worked on water privatization issues on a national scale: CODA,

32

Nicaraguan Social Movement-Another World is Possible and LIDECONIC are the main two.
The formation of Potable Water and Sewage Committees (CAPS) has exploded at a municipal
level, with over 5000 CAPS in existence in Nicaragua working for water service for their
individual communities (Meléndez 2008).
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RNDC and MCN. The ways in which different civil society organizations
struggle against water privatization on a national scale was largely dependent on
their relationship with the Nicaraguan state. Ultimately, the CODA has been most
effective because they engaged with the state without becoming subservient to it.
I analyze each of these organizations independently, beginning with the RNDC.
National Consumer Defense Network (RNDC)
The National Consumer Defense Network (RNDC) is a national
organization that has a presence in eight departments throughout Nicaragua. It
was founded in 2001, after the announced 30% increases in water rates, to oppose
water privatization in Nicaragua. The Network quickly became one of the leading
organizations working on this issue in the country (Flores 2008). The RNDC
protested the National Assembly to get the National Water Law passed, but the
law that was passed in the fall of 2007 had a very different spirit to it than the
version of the law the RNDC supported. I interviewed a staff member of the
RNDC, Pedro Flores, to discuss the tactics of the RNDC in organizing against
water privatization in Nicaragua.
Flores is a part-time regional coordinator in the department of Matagalpa.
Although staunchly against the Ortega government personally, his membership in
the RNDC restricted the ways in which he could organize Nicaraguans against
water privatization. During our interview, he focused on the political challenges
to organizing against water privatization in Nicaragua. According to Flores, there
are several challenges and roadblocks to changing the policies passed by this
government. It will take “50,000 signatures to ask for a change to the law, and
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even then the National Assembly can just shelve the signatures and not bring up
the proposed changes for debates. And with the court system dominated by the
political parties” there is little hope for changing the law in a legal manner (Flores
2008).
Other challenges Flores identifies to creating changes in water laws are
also inherently political. Flores believes that “Daniel Ortega is one of the worst
presidents that we have ever had in Nicaragua.” Ortega practices a system of
patronage, appointing his friends to government posts instead of people who are
knowledgeable and should be in power. And the corruptness of this system
means that people who are qualified for the job may not want to take it, because
they fear they will be also labeled as corrupt. “This government,” Flores told me,
“is not governing in the interest of the country.” Instead, it is yet another example
of “interrupting cycles of development” in which the politicians do not have a
long-term development plan for Nicaragua, and are governing in their own
interests and for the betterment of themselves and their friends (2008).
These sentiments of Flores complicate the political situation that the
RNDC has found itself embroiled in. After the reelection of Daniel Ortega in
2006 on an anti-water privatization platform, he appointed the president of the
RNDC, Ruth Herrera, to the presidency of ENACAL. Her appointment
acknowledged the significance of her movement in the political system of
Nicaragua. Yet it also led to the decreasing of significance of her organization in
the national fight against water privatization. The Network has been criticized by
many other groups and people working against water privatization because of the
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close ties it has with the state. The appointment of Ruth Herrera was a corporatist
strategy used to bring the RNDC closer to the state. This strategy was an attempt
to control and pacify the organizational power of the RNDC.
Although the movement was a leading force for change in Nicaragua from
2001 to 2005, the appointment of Ruth Herrera to head ENACAL demobilized the
movement in two ways. The first was that her appointment brings allegations of
co-optation: some people no longer believe that the RNDC is representing the
interests of consumers and citizens of Nicaragua. Instead, they believe that the
RNDC is now subservient to the interests of the FSLN-dominated Nicaragua
state. With the former president of the RNDC running the water services in
Nicaragua, many other organizations in civil society in Nicaragua have labeled
her appointment a blatant form of co-optation of a previously-strong social
movement in Nicaragua, with one prominent Nicaraguan scholar even stating that
her appointment was a “beheading of the leadership” by Ortega (Blandón 2008).
The other perspective is that the RNDC has triumphed and that the battle
against water privatization in Nicaragua has been won. With Ruth Herrera as the
president of ENACAL, some of my informants believed that the threat of water
privatization was neutralized. She would not, they believed, allow water to be
privatized in Nicaragua. As Hellman (1992) has argued, the absorption of civil
society by the state, a political campaign or a larger movement can actually
further the cause of a smaller movement and may show the strength and success
of the movement. In this lens, some citizens argue that the government will take
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care of the water privatization issue, and that there is no longer a need to continue
to press the state for political change.
Due to a combination of both reasons, the RNDC has largely demobilized.
The amount of national offices has decreased in Nicaragua. Matagalpa, one of the
first departments slated for privatization, and a department that currently has a
concessioned water company in AMAT, no longer has a regional office.
Although above Flores personally blames the Ortega administration for bad
governance, his organization has done little to oppose the new water privatization
law, since they are hesitant to be publicly critical of Ruth Herrera. His hands are
tied through his employment with the RNDC. The RNDC was incorporated into
the state structure, and because of that have benefited slightly because Herrera has
privileged access to the state as a state-employee. However, she cannot use that
privileged access for change, because she instead is answerable to Ortega instead
of her former constituency and members/staff of the RNDC. This challenge
represents a key paradox of corporatism.
Diamond (1994) argues that civil society is a prime location to recruit new
employees for the state structure, yet does not problematize what their hiring will
mean for the continued relations between state and civil society organizations. In
the case of the RNDC, Ruth Herrera led the charge for a complicated water law
that does not prohibit privatization or concession of water in Nicaragua. Her
organization has been largely discredited and demobilized, largely on account of
the close relationship between the RNDC and the Nicaraguan state. Over the past
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two years, this relationship has negatively affected the type of change that the
RNDC can fight for in Nicaragua.
Another consequence of the corporatist relationship between the RNDC
and the Nicaraguan state is the way in which the Network collaborates with other
organizations also working on issues of water privatization. Other organizations
are reluctant to work with the RNDC when the network is considered subservient
to, or an appendage of, the corporatist state. This limits horizontal relationships
with other civil society organizations. The RNDC has isolated itself due to its
close alignment with the government.
Not once in our interview, which lasted two and a half hours, did Flores
mention working with another group. Nor did other groups I met with mention
coordinating events or protests with the RNDC. Instead, Flores (2008)
emphasized the importance of the RNDC itself in the struggle against water
privatization, telling me the RNDC “is the vanguard of water rights.” By not
making alliances with the other civil society organizations in Matagalpa, and by
glorifying their position in the water movement, the RNDC seems to have a weak
presence in the water struggle in Nicaragua. The perceived co-optation of the
movement by other civil society organizations has alienated the RNDC from other
groups working against water privatization in Nicaragua, such as the MCN.
Nicaraguan Communal Movement (MCN)
On the other end of the state-civil society collaboration spectrum lies the
Nicaraguan Communal Movement. The MCN dates back to the formation of the
Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS) founded under the banner of the FSLN in
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1978 to further the revolutionary struggle.34 The MCN became independent from
the FSLN in 1988, and has become a complete autonomous organization, free of
ties to NGOs, the church, the state or political parties. They claim to be the only
organization of its kind in that respect in Nicaragua (Castillo 2008). In Matagalpa,
where the MCN works in ten out of 13 municipalities, the MCN has been the
organization that has been at the forefront of protesting the perceived
privatization, high tariffs and unjust service of AMAT (Castillo 2008).
Nationally, they have been one of the leading groups working against water
privatization.
Autonomy is the one aspect of organizing that the MCN values above all
else. The Communal Movement interprets state and civil society relations in the
liberal democratic tradition. Diamond defines civil society in autonomous terms,
stating, “Civil society is distinct and autonomous not only from the state and
society at large but also from a fourth arena of social action, political action
(meaning, in essence, the party system)” (7). Since the history of the MCN lies
within the Sandinista party system, and the independence of the Movement was
achieved after allegations of misuse of the committees, the idea of autonomy is
essential for the MCN.
Janeth Castillo, who works in the Matagalpa office of the MCN, told me in
a 2008 interview that water concessions are “basically privatization” and therefore
need to be protested. The MCN has protested in front of the mayor’s office, the
34

As previously mentioned, these committees were formed to help organize citizens to mobilize
around the needs of local communities. During the later years of the revolution, allegations that
the CDSs were being used for surveillance instead of community development surfaced, and the
movement decided that they required independence and autonomy from the FSLN. Their
relationship with the state transitioned from one of corporatism to one of liberalism.
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AMAT offices, the National Assembly, and in the streets of Matagalpa. The
Movement has organized forums, mobilizations, demonstrations and other forms
of organizations against water privatization in the past decade.35 Their actions,
although plentiful, have not been very effective in achieving change. Why?
Again, a crucial paradox is perceived. The MCN wants to be independent so that
they can protest or lobby in whichever way they see fit, even when this very
autonomy lessens the impact of the actions undertaken by the MCN.
“It is very difficult with this government” to achieve political change and
organize the people, Castillo (2008) argues, because they are attempting to link
the citizens to the state while bypassing non-state organized civil society. But
Castillo believes that autonomous citizen organization is possible. Increasingly,
using legal means to work for political change is becoming more common. To
oppose many laws, it is helpful for organizations to have lawyers at their disposal.
As described in Chapter 3, since only certain organizations can afford to hire
lawyers, this effectively shuts out some of the smaller or less-well-funded
organizations from the legal route to achieve political change. “Does this mean
that protest is not a viable means to change the society?” I questioned of Castillo.
“No,” she responded. “Protests should always happen.” It has just become
increasingly difficult for the voice of the average person to be heard.
I interviewed employees or volunteers of several organizations in
Nicaragua in the spring of 2008. Out of these organizations, the MCN undertook
the most diverse forms of action against water privatization. It also undertook
35

Sometimes in conjunction with CODA organizations, including, CentroHumboldt, Center for
Health Information and Accessbility Services (CISAS), Association of Integral Community
Development (ADIC), and La Cuculmeca also participate in these actions and help to plan them.
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more direct forms of action against the government. Similar to the RNDC, the
MCN saw low success rates in the struggle against water privatization. However,
it is for the opposite reasons.
The MCN is too autonomous from the state in order to enact meaningful
change. One of the roles of an autonomous civil society is to “creat[e] channels
other than the political parties for the articulation, aggregation, and representation
of interests” (Diamond 1994, 8). These alternative forms of political participation
threaten President Daniel Ortega and his Sandinista party-dominated Nicaraguan
state. Traditionally, threats to the state have originated in autonomous civil
society organizations or social movements. Therefore, unstable governments are
largely distrustful of full autonomous organizations and movements, which is
problematic as trust is one of the most important aspects of a positive relationship
between the state and civil society organizations in developing countries
(Brinkerhoff 1999, 73-4). Ortega himself knows first-hand the threats that
autonomous organizations play to undermining a government. His FSLN
guerrilla group, without ties to the state structure, led the overthrow of the
Somoza regime in 1979.
The MCN is a confrontational organization, and does not shy away from
making demands on the state in a variety of forms. This can be explained through
what theorist Célestin Monga (1994) has termed a ‘civic deficit,’ which occurs
when civil society develops in a context that the state frequently abuses civil
society organization. “‘In order to survive and resist laws and rules judged to be
antiquated, people have had to resort to the treasury of their imagination. Given
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that life is one long fight against the state, the collective imagination has gradually
conspired to craftily defy everything which symbolizes public authority’”
(Diamond 1994, 14). This perspective on civil society and state interactions does
not appeal to the state, who therefore may not want to engage in dialogues with
conflictive civil society organizations. This mindset positions civil society
organizations into an inherently conflictive stance with the government, and
minimizes the possibility for cooperation between the organization and the state.
For this reason, the MCN, although undertaking many different types of actions,
has not been the most successful in working against water privatization in
Nicaragua.
Coalition of Organizations for Water Rights (CODA)
The Coalition of Organizations for Water Rights was formed in 2005 by
five organizations.36 These organizations had all worked in the “No Privatización
de los Recursos Hidricos” movement: the movement against the privatization of
water resources. Since its inception, the coalition has grown to a current number
of 13 organizations (Meléndez 2008). These organizations include
representatives from NGOs, unions, and social movements in Nicaragua (Cuadra
2008).
CODA adopted a cooperative, legal focus as the organizations struggle
against water privatization in Nicaragua. However, the CODA emphasized that
they also worked on other areas. The three main focuses of the CODA were:

36

The founding organizations are: Centro Humboldt (a sustainable environment and
environmental organization), the Center for Health Information and Accessibility Services
(CISAS), La Cuculmeca (an indigenous educational and community organization), the
Mesoamerican Information Service about Sustainable Agriculture (SIMAS) and LIDECONIC.
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“Monitoreo, Sensibilización e Incidencia.” They monitored government actions
and laws, such as the General Water Law, undertook educational campaigns about
government actions and citizen rights, and planned and organized political events
and protests. The CODA addressed privatization “by way of holding educational
conferences for the citizens” and “establishing alliances with other local and
national organizations and within indigenous communities and local
governments” (Cuadra 2008).
CODA meetings have traditionally been well-attending and led in a very
democratic manner. I attended a CODA planning meeting at La Cuculmeca
offices on 18 April 2008 in Jinotega and engaged in participant observation. At
this meeting, the CODA representatives tried to improve the marco jurídico
(strong legal standard) to protect water resources in Nicaragua. The meeting I
attended was intended to define where the CODA should focus their energy and
resources in the coming months. Denis Meléndez, the representative from
CISAS, led the meeting in a largely egalitarian and democratic way, asking for
input at every stage of the meeting, and making sure that everyone had a chance
to express their opinion.
Establishing an initial marco jurídico with the passage of Law 620 was a
significant accomplishment for the CODA, as the coalition organized and lobbied
strongly on behalf of the law. Several CODA members expressed disappointment
with how weak the initial law was. However, the establishment of a legal
precedent against water service privatization, albeit it yet undefined, must be seen
as at least a partial victory for civil society. “It is not the best law, but at least we
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now have a marco jurídico” commented Maura Morales of LIDECONIC (2008).
Vilma Pérez (2008) of ADIC adds, “Before, when we held protests, the people did
not participate because they used to say that we had no legal basis [to oppose
water privatization], but now if they know the law they can say, ‘it is here in the
law’ and they will attend the protests.”
The CODA meeting began on a positive note, with Meléndez’s comment
that CODA member organizations “have realized different territorial events in
Matagalpa, Jinotega, Leon, Somoto, and Nueva Segovia to present the new
General Water Law and to start a process of consulting” with communities
throughout Nicaragua. Now that the new law has been passed and published, the
next step is to disseminate the meaning of the law and start a process of reforming
the law to protect the Nicaraguan people against water privatization and to
promote further water rights. CODA recognizes the right of the government to
create laws, and is working both with the government, through lobbying, and
independent of the government, through education and protests, in attempts to
strengthen the water law.
Disseminating the law is a major area of work for the CODA. The
government often does not provide copies of the law to citizens, printing few
copies and preferring to keep the average citizen ignorant about their rights. For
this reason, the CODA has decided to dedicate a significant part of its annual
$9000 budget to publishing copies of the law to distribute to communities, with a
goal to have a copy in every community in Nicaragua.
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Furthermore, the CODA has contracted someone to “translate” the water
law into common Spanish. “We are writing a common version of the law to
translate the law into a more understandable language for the population.
Because with this law, if we are going to work in educating the people, we need to
bring forth the information presented in a less complicated language” (Pérez
2008).37 This complicated presentation of the law was intentional, believes Vilma
Pérez. The Ortega government operated on the basis that “the less a population
understands about the law, the better. If the government wanted the population to
understand the law more easily, they would have made is in a simpler way.” By
disseminating the law, the CODA could make the government more transparent,
and would fulfill the role of watchdog. If the CODA worked too closely with the
government, the Coalition would not be able to challenge the laws of the
government or to critique the manner in which the law was written. The
maintenance of some autonomy by the CODA allows them to press for a more
transparent governance system.
Even taking into account the differences some CODA organizations have
with the central government, the CODA is working in cooperation with some
government representatives to attempt to strengthen the law by “creating a
network of influence of contacts with some legislators who are interested in
defending water rights and coordinating political actions” to strengthen Law 620
(Pérez 2008) One way to change the law is to make a proposal of changes to the
37

In my research, I attempted to read the LGAN in Spanish, and had a very difficult time. Even
when I understood the complex Spanish vocabulary, I still did not understand what the law was
requiring in several cases. I told this to my advisor, and she agreed with me. “Even I needed a
dictionary at hand when I read the law,” admitted Vilma Pérez (2008-2 May), a college-educated
professional.
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Natural Environment Commission, and put pressure on them to accept the
proposal. For this reason, it is helpful to have deputies in alliance with the
CODA.
Several representatives from civil society have expressed doubts that the
law, either in its current form or in a proposed revised and strengthened form, will
not be fully implemented. Civil society organizations, such as the CODA, “check
state power by challenging its autonomy at both national and local scales,
pressing for change and developing an alternative set of perspectives and
policies” (Mercer 2002, 9). As of 2008, there were not nearly enough checks and
balances in Nicaraguan politics, as the state apparatus is largely dominated by a
single political party: the FSLN. The CODA therefore acts as a non-partisan third
party to bring into question the policies of the government without threatening the
government.
The CODA challenged laws that they perceived as unjust or not stringent
enough, doing so in a cooperative manner that facilitated a dialogue between the
state and civil society organizations. The CODA benefited from being a coalition,
in that it united a disparate group of organizations who focused on issues of public
health, indigenous rights, women’s rights, community organizing and sustainable
agriculture, to name a few, around a common cause: preventing water
privatization. This coalition did not threaten the state because it cultivated
cooperative relationships with legislators and other members of the government
apparatus, yet the organizations in the CODA still maintained their independence
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from the state, which gave them many more opportunities in deciding what form
of action they want to undertake.
This cooperation between the government and the CODA engaged
citizens in state decisions, and held the state more accountable to the demands of
the people of Nicaragua. Adopting a cooperative framework in interaction with
the state signified that the civil society organizations in CODA could not solely
complain about a government policy, but instead needed to make efforts to
propose a viable alternative. They not only held protests about the shortcomings
of the law, but they also worked with members of the government in order to
reform the law into something that would better serve the Nicaraguan people. As
of 2008, it appeared that the route the CODA took with their interactions with the
state was most efficacious. The three organizations, their perspectives on a
healthy relationship with the state, strategies and tactics and the end result are
illustrated below:

Chart 4.2: Water Rights Organizations and Relationships with the State
Relationship
Outcome
Strategies/Tactics
Organization
with State
RNDC
Corporatist
Protested and organized Demobilization
(National
citizens until the
-Allegations of
Network in
promotion of Ruth
co-optation
Defense of
Herrera (president of
-Thoughts of
Consumers)
RNDC) to head
victory for
ENACAL, the state
movement
water company
MCN
LiberalProtests, forums,
Mobilization
(Nicaraguan
Democratic
demonstrations against without
Communal
the national and local
engagement of the
Movement)
government
state, little success
in reforms
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CODA
(Coalition of
Organizations
for Water
Rights)

Cooperative

Lobbying and legal
advocacy in
cooperation with the
state, protests and
educational campaigns
outside of the state

Mobilization,
continued pressure
on the state.
Moderate success
in reforms.

Conclusion
In the beginning of this chapter, I proposed that organizations that were
too closely tied with or too isolated from the Nicaraguan state would be less able
to work for social change in Nicaragua. I instead posited that organizations that
work cooperatively with the state but independently from it will be more
successful in achieving change in Nicaragua. I evaluated this hypothesis using a
three-prong case study of the anti-water privatization movement in Nicaragua. By
analyzing three movements that were attempting to achieve the same change in
Nicaragua, I have been able to focus on the strategies that they use in order to
further their goals.
The CODA is the only organization that fits the definition of a successful
state and civil society partnership.

This partnership can be defined as “cross-

sectoral interactions whose purpose is to achieve convergent objectives through
the combined efforts of both sets of actors [state and civil society organizations],
but where the respective roles and responsibilities of the actors involved remain
distinct. The essential rationale is that these interactions generate synergistic
effects; that is, more and/or better outcomes are attained than if the partners acted
independently” (Brinkerhoff 1991, 61). The RNDC failed this definition because
the role of the Network has converged with the state and, because of this, the
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Network lost almost all autonomy with the appointment of Ruth Herrera to the
presidency of ENACAL. This was due to the corporatist relationship the RNDC
leadership entered into with the state. The MCN does not meet this definition
because the Movement would not collaborate with the government in order to
harness their ‘combined efforts’ and instead set itself up in opposition to the state.
Instead, they chose to adopt the liberal-democratic perspective, which isolated
them from the state and decision-making process.
The CODA worked with the state in an acknowledgement that the state is
a necessary collaborator in the process to permanently put an end to water
privatization in Nicaragua. The member organizations recognized that the CODA
can enact limited change by solely working in the civil society sphere, and by
engaging with the state and incorporating a legal focus into their struggle against
water privatization, they are more able to work for change in Nicaragua.
Furthermore, the CODA has maintained autonomy from the state. They are able
to criticize the state about laws they perceive as unjust, and have held teach-ins,
trainings and protests to raise awareness about the negative aspects of water
privatization.
Can my findings be extended to other struggles and civil society
organizations in Nicaragua? Due to time and space constraints, I will only be able
to test part of my hypothesis. I will focus on the organizations with corporatist
ties to the state, analyzing only one-third of my hypothesis. In the following
chapter, I examine the institution of Citizen Power Councils (CPCs). These
Councils were closely tied to the state, with their formation mandated by
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President Ortega. They were nationally administered by Ortega’s wife, Rosario
Murillo. Does the relationship between the state and these forms of civil society
prevent the CPCs from achieving change in their society, as I have proposed in
this chapter? Or does the relationship encourage dialogue between the state and
civil society, and allow for the CPCs to work for societal change in Nicaragua?
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Chapter 5:
Citizen Power Councils: Corporatist and Co-opted Civil Society
Introduction
Driving through the streets of Managua, it is impossible to avoid them.
Bright pink billboards hanging from buildings or on overpasses, all showing a
triumphant re-elected Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, fist raised to the sky,
exclaiming “Arriba los pobres del mundo!” In his quest to encourage the poor of
the world to rise up, Ortega has plastered his image throughout Nicaragua, telling
the average citizen that they deserve more power in society and government
throughout direct democracy. He has positioned himself as the only legitimate
heir to the leftist revolutionary tradition in Nicaragua.
To fulfill his stated goal of direct democracy, Ortega created the Citizen
Power Councils, or CPCs, in 2007, to facilitate the formation of organizing
citizens who will then support his political party and goals. CPCs are citizen
councils formed at a local level with the stated goal to organize Nicaraguans
around certain issues, give citizens input into local government, and distribute
certain programs of the national government. A more in-depth definition will be
provided in the following sections. CPCs are evaluated in this chapter as an indepth case study of the corporatist tradition in Nicaragua, through the lens of my
hypothesis developed in Chapter 4, which stated that organizations that were too
close to the state were not able to effectively work for change on a national level
in the complex political environment of Nicaragua.
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This chapter employs the theoretical framework of William Grigsby3839 to
argue that Daniel Ortega created the CPCs in the latest attempt in a historical
effort to incorporate citizens into the government and provide support for his
policies and political party. Since the state and government in Nicaragua are
largely synonymous with the party in power (currently the National Sandinista
Liberation Front- FSLN), the CPCs are therefore also being used to incorporate
citizens into the FSLN political party structures. This corporatist method of
governance and organizing signified that citizens in the CPCs are unable to voice
their concerns of the government and are unable to work for meaningful change in
Nicaragua in any opposition to the government. By creating CPCs in the
corporatist tradition, building on the precedence of historical antecedents, Ortega
and the FSLN hoped to control the political and social organizing of citizens in
Nicaragua, and harness the citizens of Nicaragua for partisan purposes: to support
the Sandinista party and politics.
This chapter begins with a brief description of Grigsby’s analysis of the
historical trajectory of the FSLN in relation to grassroots organizing and popular
support, further building on the historical component of Chapter 2. The FSLN has
a long history of organizing citizens, beginning with the pre-revolutionary
formation of the Sandinista Defense Councils (CDSs) in 1978. My analysis
38

Grigsby is a Sandinista insider, a member of the most radical wing of the Sandinistas. A
journalist, he has grown critical of Daniel Ortega as he perceives Ortega to have strayed from the
revolutionary goal.
39
Grigsby, as many of the other authors in this chapter (Baltodano, Cuadra & Ruiz, Equipo
Nitlapán) writes for Envío Magazine, a Nicaraguan publication that is published out of the Central
American University in Managua. The magazine began publication in 1981, with the stated goal
to send the revolutionary message from Nicaragua to the rest of the world. Although they
sometimes critiqued the revolution, they also largely supported the revolutionary project and were
never censored. For more information, see their website:
http://www.envio.org.ni/quienes_somos.en.
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includes a focus on the historical antecedents to the CPCs, looking at previous
state-led attempts to organize Nicaraguan citizens, in order to establish a pattern
of FSLN domination and corporatism in citizen relations. Next, I look at the
contentious formation of the CPCs in Nicaragua, to show the polarization of
political opinion in Nicaragua and illustrate the political context in which the
CPCs developed. I analyze the structure of the CPCs, both in a national context
and within each council to demonstrate that the hierarchical structure of the CPCs
perpetuated a pattern of corporatism and disallowed for social change. Finally, I
describe the debate raging in Nicaragua as of 2008 about the role and legitimacy
of the CPCs, focusing mainly on claims that the CPCs were corporatist, partisan
organizations using the organizations to reward and privilege FSLN party
members, while isolating other voices and organizations from politics and society.
Theoretical Framework
William Grigsby (2007) details the historical trajectory of the FSLN to
explain why Ortega proposed and developed the CPCs. He argues that the FSLN
transitioned from a glorified, selective, militant revolutionary group in the 1970s
to a state-party of the 1980s that “fed off its historical strength” until the
instatement of a draft and the subsequent electoral loss to Violeta Chamorro in
1990. After the electoral defeat, the FSLN had to decide whether to be a political
party in the electoral system or to continue to be a revolutionary and grassrootscentric group. The FSLN leadership chose the electoral system, abandoning “the
methods of grassroots struggle and prioritiz[ing] the parliamentary and electoral
struggles.” This decision created a major schism in the party, causing many
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members to renounce their membership in the FSLN and withdraw from party
politics. Grigsby sees the emphasis on electoral politics as corrupting the original
Sandinista mentality.
Grigsby argues that the FSLN won the presidential election in 2006
because the party was “an army of around 30,000 very efficient electoral
monitors… an efficient skeleton, an effective electoral machine run by
determined people.” He further posits that Daniel Ortega and his wife, Rosario
Murillo,
know they can’t advance in society without an instrument that helps them
reap any political benefits from the government’s implementation of
programs in favor of the poor sectors. They both know that someone has
to act as harvester and they don’t have the people to harvest any more,
because everyone in the FSLN has been looking for a cut of the pie… So
they decided to create the Councils of Citizens’ Power (CPC) by decree,
as a way of organizing the grassroots sectors whose consciousness has
been built. They’re basically saying, ‘I decree that the people are going to
organize now.’
In this way, Grigsby perceives the development of the CPCs as an attempt to
create support for an inefficient and ineffective political party: the FSLN. This
attempt was overtly corporatist.
Historical Antecedents of the CPCs
The formation of a structure to represent citizen interests by the state,
social movements or political parties is nothing new in Nicaragua. In 1978, the
Sandinista Defense Councils (CDS) formed as one of several grassroots
organizations organizing to support the Sandinista revolutionary struggle.
Grigsby explains that they began during the final year of fighting against Somoza
in individual neighborhoods “to help those wounded in combat” and evolved to
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become “political schools” involved in grassroots organizing and the
conscientization of Nicaraguans (Grigsby 2007). After the FSLN came to power
in 1979, the CDSs continued organizing in neighborhoods and addressing local
concerns at a neighborhood level.
Two years after their formation, the CDSs boasted 500,000 members, the
largest single organization in the country (Envío Team 1989). However, as
conflict ravaged the country and partisanship developed in opposition to the rule
of the FSLN government in the mid-late 1980s, the CDS began to lose support.
The FSLN began to rely on the CDSs for national security and defense operations
in the corporatist framework, instead of prioritizing neighborhood concerns,
which had been done in the early 1980s. “To some degree, the difficulties in the
CDS may have reflected broader problems in the relationship between the FSLN
as a party and the mass organizations” (Envío Team 1989). The FSLN was
attempting to harvest support from mass organizations, again employing
corporatist models of interaction with civil society organizations. This support
was meant to be unquestionable, and would streamline the participation of
Nicaraguans in the revolution.
Grigsby identifies minimal shared characteristics of the CPCs and the
CDSs by focusing on the different political context in which the two different
organizational structures developed. In 1978, the CDSs were an opportunity to
people to become involved in an exciting and hopeful revolution to overthrow a
hereditary dictatorship that had dominated Nicaragua for four decades. The CDSs
were grassroots organizations that gave power to the FSLN as a movement, and
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later as a ruling party, until their organizational power was abused by the FSLN
leadership. It was this abuse that converted the CDSs into corporatist
organization. When Ortega came to power in 2006, on the other hand, it was with
substantially less popular support than he had enjoyed in 1979. He recognized
that in order to gain enough support in order to implement his policies, he needed
to revitalize the “electoral skeleton” and breathe new life into the “electoral
machine.”40 Ortega therefore created the CPCs as corporatist structures to begin
with, and appointed his wife, Rosario Murillo, to head the CPC structure. This
would guarantee that the CPCs would channel the support they received to the
state projects proposed by Ortega as well as Ortega himself and his political party.
He attempted to re-create the success the CDSs had in providing support for the
FSLN government, at least until the schism that happened in 1988 between the
CDSs and the FSLN.
The CDSs decided in 1988 that grassroots organizing should be prioritized
above citizen vigilantism, and declared their independence from the FSLN. They
evolved into the Nicaraguan Communal Movement, or MCN. The MCN has
become a completely autonomous organization, free of ties to NGOs, the church,
the state or political parties. They claim to be the only organization of its kind in
respect to autonomy in Nicaragua (Castillo 2008). The MCN continues to
organize citizens around issues of health, youth, gender, housing, education, and
basic services, as well as working against water privatization as demonstrated in
Chapter 4.

40

In the words of Grigsby (2007).
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In 1990, Violeta Chamorro was elected president, bringing a wealth of
neoliberal policies to Nicaragua after eleven years of revolutionary government
under the FSLN. Hundreds of new civil society organizations sprang up in the
new political system (Borchgrevink 2006, 8), many opposition the new neoliberal
governments. Citizen participation was proliferating throughout the country, but
without much legal support in which to lobby the government, on any level, for
changes in policies. Finally, in 2003, Law 475 was passed, the Law of Citizen
Participation.41 This law was meant to codify efforts to strengthen local
democracy, and “gave us an institutionalized model of participation” in
government (Cuadra and Ruiz 2008). The passage of the law was hard-fought for
by civil society members and contributed to community organizing. One of the
main successes of this law was the devolution of the budgeting allocation to a
municipal level, and allowing local groups of people to have a larger say in
budgetary issues.
Law 475 was passed in the liberal tradition, creating legal, autonomous
methods for citizen organizing. However, it also dictated the following model of
citizen participation for consultations with the government:
at the grassroots level there are rural District Development
Committees (CDCs) and urban Barrio Development Committees
and Residential Associations. At the municipal level there are
Municipal Development Committees (CDMs) and Consultative
Working Groups. At the departmental level, there are
Departmental Development Committees (CDDs) and in the two
Caribbean autonomous regions the Regional Development
Committees. Finally, at the national level, we have the National
Social and Economic Planning Council (CONPES) and the
Sectoral Councils (Cuadra and Ruiz 2008).
41

This law passed under liberal President Enrique Bolaños.

94

These different levels of organization were constructed so that citizens and
members of civil society could be consultants to the state and bring their concerns
and expertise to the state. Although largely ineffective on a national level,
because Bolaños, in the liberal tradition, refused to work with independent civil
society, CDCs and CDMs were somewhat effective locally.
The CDMs were the most active of the levels of organization, and bore the
responsibility for planning development projects, negotiating the budget, and
evaluating the development projects to see how they were contributing to the
betterment of the community (Malishchak 2008, 3). This form of organizing
represented a way for citizens to get involved in local democracy and
development. This process involved diverse groups of people, including
representatives from a variety of civil society organizations and elected
representatives from different communities, among others.
Creation of the CPCs
In 2004, the FSLN won 87 municipal elections.42 Party leaders took this as
a sign of continued electoral support for their party. In 2005 the party announced
plans to develop a “‘Sandinista Municipal Management Model’” to encourage
“‘direct democracy’… [and] present the FSLN as a force that comes into local
government to give power to the people” (Cuadra and Ruiz 2008). This effort
was not implemented until Ortega was elected to the presidency in 2006. He was
elected to the office of the presidency with only 38% of the vote in the first round,
due to electoral changes mandated by el pacto. According to Grigsby (2007), this
low voter turnout for the FSLN represents frustration with the pro-party politics
42

Out of 152.
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ideology that the FSLN has adopted. It also represents perceived frustration that
“nobody (in the FSLN hierarchy) aspired to position of power to serve the people,
to change things, to improve people’s living standards… all they wanted was to
give orders, have money in their pockets….”
Upon taking office in 2007, Daniel Ortega made citizen participation
through the formation of the CPCs one of his biggest emphases. Ortega included
the CPCs as a party structure within the state apparatus by writing them into Law
290.43 After heavy debate in the National Assembly, the PLC, National Liberal
Alliance (ALN) and Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) benches voted
together to oppose the addition of the CPCs in the executive branch of
government. “The parliamentary opposition considered that the FSLN has the
right to create any organizations it wants, but not to give them a state role,
institutional life or public funds or to make them part of the state in any other
way” (Equipo Nitlapán 2007b). In September of 2007, they voted to remove the
CPCs from Law 290.
Ortega responded by vetoing the reformed law, but the opposition bloc
mustered enough votes to override the veto and kept the CPCs out of the
executive branch. What occurred next was blatantly illegal and showed the
continued power el pacto had over Nicaraguan political life. The FSLNdominated Managua Court of Appeals prohibited the veto-override from coming
to fruition, as the head of an unofficial Managuan CPC filed a writ of protection.
The Court of Appeals was stacked with FSLN-leaning judges because of el pacto
(Telléz 2008). Not surprisingly, the Court of Appeals voted in favor of the CPCs.
43

This law was meant to reorganize the executive branch of government.
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The 52 legislators who had united to overthrow the veto threatened to boycott the
National Assembly and prevent any official business from taking place. Ortega
responded by threatening to rule by decree with the absence of the Assembly. Expresident Alemán convinced enough of the PLC senators to stop the boycott and
instead support Ortega, with whom he had made el pacto. To ensure that the
CPCs would be legally created, Ortega issued “a new presidential decree that
created them [the CPCs] all over again” (Equipo Nitlapán 2007b) on November
29, 2007.
In order to create an organizational structure to bring direct democracy to
the citizens, as Ortega’s discourse claims, Ortega resorted to not one but two
undemocratic approaches to create the CPCs, against the will of the legislative
body. He used a stacked court and a presidential decree to circumvent the
established means to create a new part of the government. Furthermore, he
appointed his wife, Rosario Murillo, as the head of the CPCs, foregoing an
election to decide the power structure of the CPCs.
Institutional Structure of the CPCs
Each CPC is theoretically organized in a similar way. Each should have
more than 100 people as members, with 16 coordinators. Each coordinator is
responsible for organizing around a different issue. The sixteen issues are
illustrated on the following page:
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Chart 5.1: Sixteen Organizing Issues for CPCs
Health
Communications and Propaganda
Education

Human Rights

Environment

Citizen Security

Transportation

Women’s Rights

Rural Development

Children/Youth Rights

Roads

Senior Rights

Culture

Local Government Proposals

Sports

Self-Employment Programs

Although the CPCs are hailed as being a horizontal structure to facilitate
direct democracy and local governance by the FSLN, their detractors accuse them
as being hierarchically organized, with all lines of power leading to Rosario
Murillo and Daniel Ortega. Cuadra and Ruiz (2007) argue that the FSLN
essentially created a top-down structure when it created the CPCs. This CPC
structure, they further assert, mirrors the structure already in place with the Law
475 and the Municipal Development Committees. I have created a chart to show
the parallels between the new CPC organizational structures, on the right, with the
existing forms of organization on the left.
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Chart 5.2: Similarities between 2003 and 2007 Citizen Organizational
Structures
Region
Law 475-2003 Structure CPC-2007 Structure
Local Level
District Development
Citizen Power Councils
Committees (CDC)
(CPC)
Municipal Level
Municipal Development
Municipal Citizen Power
Committees (CDM)
Cabinets (GPC)
Departmental Level
Departmental
Departmental Citizen
Development
Power Councils
Committees (CDD)
Caribbean Coast
Regional Economic and
Regional Citizen Power
Social Planning Councils Councils
National Level
CONPES
National Citizen Power
Council
This chart illustrates the similarities between the structures of citizenship
participation that were created in 2003 versus that created by Ortega in 2007.
Viewing the two institutions side-by-side, it becomes apparent that Ortega was
trying to replace the already operating forms of citizen participation with that of
the CPCs. The fundamental difference between the two structures, especially at
the national level, involved the type of government control that the presidents at
the time wanted to achieve. Whereas the 2003 system was created in the spirit of
liberalism, as an attempt to control civil society through legal means and trivialize
independent civil society organizations, the CPCs were created in the tradition of
corporatism to unite citizens in the state structure and breathe new life into the
FSLN political machine.
What happened to the CDM structure with the emergence of the CPCs? In
regions of Nicaragua that were dominated by FSLN activists, sometimes the
CDMs converted themselves into CPCs and continued organizing citizens, now in
a corporatist and clientelistic manner in similar ways. Instead of working for
societal change, the CPCs distributed government policies. In liberal regions or
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neighborhoods with Sandinistas and liberals, this power struggle between the two
structures often became very pronounced. There have been cases of liberals or
MRS members not being allowed to participate in the CPCs, or CPCs attempting
to dismantle CDMs or other community organizing groups in the region in order
to portray themselves as the only legitimate community organizing group in the
area.
Corporatist Concerns
In this section, I address four major concerns of the organizing work of the
CPCs: why they tried to replace the Law 475 organizations instead of strengthen
them, their partisan nature, their use of clientelism, and their unwillingness to
work with civil society organizations. Legal concerns largely set aside44, I assess
the role the CPC played in Nicaraguan politics and society in 2007 and 2008,
focusing on how the CPCs were used to create more support for the FSLN
government as it attempted to organize civil society.
Many observers have questioned why Ortega chose to promote direct
democracy by creating a new organizational structure instead of reinforcing the
structure created by Law 475. “An authentic project of direct democracy should
have evaluated and buttressed what already existed. But the Ortega-Murillo
government’s first disregard for the law was to utterly ignore those preceding
structures and the accumulated experiences of earlier years… then they launched
a new structure that contradicts the very principals of direct democracy” (Equipo
Nitlapán 2007b). This structure is billed as the only legitimate means for the

44

Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo have “shown no concern about the CPCs’ legality… [but
they are] working hard to legitimize them” (Equipo Nitlapán 2007b).
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citizens to communicate with the government. President Ortega required FSLN
candidates for “mayor, deputy mayor and the Municipal Council sign agreements
saying that if elected they will obey the CPCs.” Furthermore, state institutions
only coordinated with CPCs when making decisions, and were not required, or
even encouraged, to meet with other organizations in civil society such as the
CDMs, MCN or other autonomous organizations. (Cuadra and Ruiz 2008).
Equipo Nitlapán of Envío further detail the responsibilities given to the
CPCs:
the CPCs will be decision-making bodies; they will propose laws;
they will make recommendations and criticisms to any authority
they want; they will be given an open door in the ministries and
mayoral offices; they will monitor the actions of government
officials at all levels; they can fire functionaries, remove mayors
and replace the existing municipal and departmental participatory
bodies… (2007a).
They are given power in order to convince people that they have a say in politics.
Like the case of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, analyzed in
Chapter 3, this could be interpreted as giving citizens token power to appease
them and preventing them from making greater, more radical, demands on the
state.
The FSLN framed itself as a structure that gives power to the people, and
then harnesses that power for its own political gains. Ortega chose to create the
CPCs to replace existing structures because the existing organizations were
created in a liberal tradition. They did not link citizen organization to the state in
the corporatist tradition Ortega had used throughout the 1980s.
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The CPC structure was one of patronage and clientelism. Daniel Ortega
has given great amounts of power to the CPCs. They distribute the Zero Hunger
and Zero Usury programs, for example. “The CPCs have already been selling
beans at cheaper prices” (Baltodano 2007). Baltodano goes on to argue that it is
because of favors such as cheaper beans or job offers that cause people to be
involved in their CPCs: in many cases it has become a rule that you must have a
recommendation from the CPC in your neighborhood to apply for any
government or municipal job. Connections with the FSLN leadership have
previously been economically advantageous for Nicaraguans. After the election
of Violeta Chamorro, but before she took office in 1990, the Sandinistas in power
orchestrated what is termed la piñata, in which “people from the outgoing
government took computers, houses, money, farms, fleets of cars… That piñata
destroyed the FSLN’s moral authority” (Grigsby 2007) and established a
questionable morality that allows for connections with the FSLN to be used for
monetary gain.
This clientelistic structure draws concerns that CPCs only benefit FSLN
members, and therefore were overtly partisan. Ortega is using the traditional
patronage systems of past governments and incorporating them into his CPCs. He
rewards citizens through vertical patronage systems if they participate in a group
that answers directly to his wife, whom many believe holds the true power in the
FSLN and is rumored to be the next presidential candidate of the FSLN. Whether
or not the CPCs really are as partisan as alleged, the perception of partisanship
means that liberals and MRS members are less likely to join a CPC. Grisgby
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(2007) writes, “Unfortunately the CPCs aren’t pluralist enough and this is a
pluralist society in which we Sandinistas are in the minority.” This is particularly
troubling in areas where the CPC is dominated by Sandinistas, but the people of
the neighborhood are of all political backgrounds.
In a country that was embroiled in a civil war that ended less than two
decades ago, “the CPCs have been rekindling Sandinista/anti-Sandinista
polarization from the minute they were announced… they’ve sparked suspicion,
revanchism, opportunism, fear, mistrust and, at the very least, growing tension
among many different sectors” (Equipo Nitlapán 2007a). Some CPCs use a
purely technical scale to determine who gets government benefits, but cries of
partisanship are rampant throughout the criticism of CPCs in Nicaragua. This is
because Ortega is using the CPCs to create support for the FSLN-dominated state.
Corporatist structures create and reinforce alliances between citizens and the state,
and since the Nicaragua state, as of 2008, was closely tied with the FSLN,
corporatism has translated to the party structure.
The final concern I will address is the unwillingness of the CPCs to work
with other societal organizations. In developing the CPCs, neither Ortega nor
anyone else in his administration ever consulted members of existing
organizations, such as the Nicaraguan Communal Movement, on how to best
organize citizens to promote local development and democracy (Equipo Nitlapán
2007a). This showed a blatant disregard for the experience the MCN had attained
in the past 30 years of representing and organizing Nicaraguan citizens.
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The CPCs have also set themselves up as rivals to some groups and
coalitions that already organize around the issues the CPCs focus on. One of the
biggest and most obvious rivals is between the CPCs and the existing women’s
organizations, which have perhaps had one of the longest and deepest autonomous
functions than any group in Nicaragua, after their radical break with the
Sandinistas in the late 1980s. The CPCs have shown “no sign of willingness to
coordinate with them; the government has clearly shown its preference for
disqualifying, weakening and supplanting them” (Equipo Nitlapán 2007B). This
is inherently related to the fact that the CPCs claim to be the only legitimate form
of organizing citizens in Nicaragua to communicate with the Nicaraguan state,
despite their alleged partisan-background and illegality. Women’s organizations
have a reputation in Nicaragua as popular organizations that truly represent
women’s issues in Nicaragua,45 and Ortega is attempting to co-opt the power and
support for the women’s organizations in order to further his own political
project. This draws similarities to the RNDC not collaborating with other civil
society organizations, as described in the previous chapter. Corporatism
discourages organizations not allied with the state from working with those that
are.
Conclusion
In a nation-wide Gallup poll, only 2.5% of Managuans and 1.8% of
greater Nicaraguans claimed membership in a CPC in 2008, with 11-14%
expressing a willingness to become involved in the future (Envío Team, 2008a).
This is a far cry from the claim of Murillo in 2007 that by the end of the year,
45

For more information, please consult Bickham-Mendez (2005).
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nearly 17,000 CPCs would have organized, with membership of over 930,000
people (Equipo Nitlapán 2007a), approximately one-third of the adult population.
What do the smaller-than-predicted numbers mean for the CPCs and for Ortega’s
government?46
Perhaps the numbers can be explained because many Nicaraguans
recognized that the CPCs were co-optive and corporatist structures. Being a
member of the CPCs limited the actions that individuals could undertake.
Membership in the CPCs was linked to political office and receiving benefits
from the state, yet could easily be revoked if a member did something that the
CPC or the FSLN disagreed with. Membership in CPCs was a double-edged
sword: it provided citizens with a privileged access to the state, but, like with the
RNDC, limited the scope of demands that could be made on the state. Again, the
paradox of corporatism is evident.
Some members agreed with goals of the CPCs, and believed the CPCs
were a legitimate institution that well represented Nicaraguan citizens. But for
others, membership in the CPCs was nothing more than a tactical embrace: they
joined for economic and political benefits and agreed to not challenge the state in
exchange for those benefits. Those populations were co-opted. The 2008 poll
showed that the vast majority of Nicaraguans rejected the corporatist and cooptive CPC structure.

46

The small numbers do not take away from the importance of the CPCs in Nicaraguan political
and social culture. As of my interviews in spring of 2008, the CPCs were arguably the most
divisive and polarizing issue in Nicaragua. Furthermore, with rumors that Rosario Murillo, First
Lady and head of the CPC structure, will be the next FSLN candidate for president, the CPCs are
of utmost importance in analyzing civil society and state interactions in Nicaragua.
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In Nicaragua, the FSLN has positioned themselves as the only legitimate
form of leftist association, and emphasized that their responsibility is to better
organize Nicaraguan people. “Sandinista leader and Nicaraguan vice president
Sergio Ramírez Mercado described the FSLN as ‘promoting a permanent dynamic
of the people’s participation… [to] give their opinions…, suggest, construct, and
direct,… organize themselves [and] attend to community, neighborhood, and
national problems’” (Booth & Richard 2006, 118). This quote portrays the
corporatist framework that the FSLN has historically used in organizing people, a
framework that Ortega adopted in 2007 in the creation of the CPCs.
Daniel Ortega overcame significant legal and legislative obstacles to form
the CPCs. He overlooked previous attempts to effectively organize Nicaraguan
citizens, and positioned the CPCs as the only legitimate form of citizen
participation. This is so that only the FSLN can benefit from the support created
by funding the CPCs and putting them in charge of distributing government
programs. During the revolution anniversary celebration in July of this year,
Ortega shouted to the crowd: “‘The only civil society is the CPCs, the only civil
society is the Sandinistas gathered here,’” (Equipo Nitlapán 2008b, 4). The CPCs
set themselves in outright opposition and rivalry to other civil society
organizations who are working on issues similar to those of the CPCs.
If, as William Grigsby claims, the FSLN is a party in deterioration because
of dwindling base, Ortega would have to do something to garner enough support
to pass his policies in Nicaragua. He recognized the weakness of his party when
he signed el pacto with Alemán in 1999, in that he perceived the ALN and MRS
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parties to be threats to the growth of the FSLN. In the political arena, this pact
has withstood challenges from both the right (ALN) and the left (MRS) and
continues to play a major role in Nicaraguan politics.
More importantly, Ortega chose to create the CPCs in order to revitalize
the FSLN party and to channel support for the national government and the FSLN
itself. This use of corporatism built on the governing style of the 1980s, and
mirrored early efforts to control civil society. The CPCs were built on an existing
structure which did not provide institutional support to the FSLN. They
attempted to replace autonomous forms of citizen organization. Although Daniel
Ortega called the CPCs the only legitimate civil society, is this an oxymoron?
Civil society, by definition, is citizen participation between the state, market and
private sphere. By emphasizing citizen participation linked closely to the state,
Ortega attempted to weaken and de-legitimize autonomous civil society. Ortega
operated in a traditional corporatist perspective, using the FSLN control of the
state, to attempt to create civil society. Yet the creation of civil society initially in
the party structure, and later the links to the state structure, has solicited
complaints of co-optation from academics and non-corporatist civil society actors
in Nicaragua.
This chapter has illustrated that corporatist forms of organization by the
Ortega government were controversial in the first two years of his presidential
term. I do not argue that CPCs are inherently negative institutions. They
represented a part of Nicaraguan society, and that segment has benefitted through
the distribution of government programs. However, the CPCs, as corporatist
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organizations that answered to the whims of the state and were created to bolster
support for the FSLN political party and Ortega’s administration, were in no
position to work for change on a national level in Nicaragua. Their relationship
with the state was not one of cooperation, partnership, nor collaboration. Instead,
it was a co-optive relationship that prevented meaningful change from occurring
in Nicaragua.
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Chapter 6:
Conclusion
The Nicaraguan state has historically created a difficult climate for civil
society organizations to pressure the state for meaningful changes in society on a
national level. Civil society organizations are viewed as potential threats or
sources for support for the state, depending on their autonomy from the state. The
Sandinistas, in the corporatist tradition, have endeavored to co-opt civil society
organizations into their party and the state. How has this threat of co-optation
impacted civil society’s prospects for achieving change in Nicaragua? What are
the differences in how co-opted civil society organizations work for change as
opposed to autonomous organizations? Can an organization be too autonomous?
My analysis of the organizations working against water privatization and
Citizen Power Councils has shown that co-optation through corporatist
frameworks has neutralized key civil society organizations, like the RNDC, and
prevented others from working towards meaningful change in Nicaragua and only
served the party purposes, like the CPCs. Organizations that emphasized
autonomy, operating in the liberal perspective, such as the MCN are also unable
to organize effectively because the state perceives them as a threat. Organizations
that chose to coordinate with the state while maintaining their identity, like the
CODA, have had the most successful relationship with the state in that they are
able to engage the state constructively while maintaining distance from the
apparatus of the state.
This analysis is situated in the studies of state-civil society interactions.
The traditional dichotomy between corporatism and liberalism cannot be
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effectively used to argue for a successful partnership between the state and civil
society organizations in Nicaragua. Instead, due to the unique historical
development of Nicaragua, it is necessary to tailor the studies of civil society and
state interactions to the Nicaraguan context, and create a third perspective that
tempers the differences between corporatism and liberalism.
The liberal-democratic perspective on civil society and state interactions,
as espoused by Larry Diamond (1994), emphasizes the importance of autonomy
from civil society organizations. Civil society must be independent from the
state, the political realm (including political parties), and the private sphere.
Diamond presupposes that civil society organizations are democratic and ascribes
ten democratic functions onto civil society organizations. Civil society
organizations should “provide for the limitation of state power” by limiting
abuses of power and monitoring the state while “supplement[ing] the role of
political parties” (Diamond 1994, 7). This Western perspective is difficult to
apply to the case of Nicaragua, a country that saw many mass organizations born
out of the FSLN political party which helped the state to obtain more power. This
Western perspective, with roots in De Tocqueville’s writings, proves inadequate
in analyzing state and civil society relationships in Nicaragua. The MCN adopts a
liberal perspective in their dealings with the state, which hampers their efforts to
change water legislation in Nicaragua.
Wiarda (2003) offers a third-world perspective on civil society, arguing
that corporatism has historical roots in areas of the world such as Latin America.
Corporatist governments incorporate organized groups of citizens into the state
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structure, using a system of state control of interest and associational groups
(Wiarda 2003, 3). This system is beneficial for the state in that it allows the
leaders of the government to continue to rule while slowly admitting, on a very
selective basis, new interest groups into the political scene. Civil society
organizations that participate in this system receive access to the state, and are
supposedly integrated into the decision making process. Although this
perspective endeavors is located closer to the history of Nicaragua than the liberal
perspective, it is also problematic. Wiarda acknowledges that this system can
become coercive and co-optive (35), and that corporatist states can continue to
govern without receiving input from the civil society organizations.
Organizations, such as the RNDC and CPCs, that operate under a corporatist
framework in Nicaragua are being used to support Ortega’s party-dominated state
and are not able to work towards meaningful change in Nicaragua. What I have
termed the ‘corporatist paradox’ is again evident: organizations that are
incorporated into the state structure are given privileged access to the state. Yet
their proximity to the state is a hindrance in working towards social change.
My research has taken a third path on viewing civil society and state
relations in Nicaragua. Instead of focusing on civil society as an abstract concept,
I have analyzed real-world examples of state and civil society interactions in
Nicaragua, situating my research in the experiences of specific organizations with
regards to the Nicaraguan state. Cooperative relationships are not new in
Nicaragua. A historical example of a successful partnership was the creation of
the Civil Coordinator after Hurricane Mitch ravaged Nicaragua in 1998. Among
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water rights organizations, the CODA is the organization that has embraced
cooperative relations with the state, and because of which are best situated to
work for social and political change in Nicaragua. Their strategy bridges the
ideological gap between corporatism and liberalism. They have maintained their
autonomy, while engaging with the state in a constructive dialogue to formulate
new water policy. This is associated with the growing trend among Nicaraguan
civil society organizations of increased lobbying and advocacy work.
Are there alternative reasons that the CODA was able to organize more
effectively against water privatization? One alternative example could be the fact
that the CODA, unlike the MCN and the RNDC, is a coalition of diverse
organizations. Using the framework of network analysis theory (Diani 2002), the
argument could be made that a coalition is able to organize a much larger
population than any of the member organizations separately. The CODA unites
organizations that focus on women’s rights, the environment, indigenous peoples,
community health, etc. Each one of the organizations frames water rights in a
different way, but each lends the strength of the organizations to the greater
whole.
I rebut this argument in two ways. The first is that coalitions are a doubleedged sword. While beneficial because of the possibility strong horizontal
relationships between civil society organizations, coalitions are prone to
factionalism. Corporatism, as practiced by the Ortega administration, attempted
to use a strategy of ‘divide and conquer’ to control civil society organizations.
Organizations without corporatist ties to the state cannot effectively work for

112

change with organizations that are allied with the state. The Civil Coordinator
was also prone to factionalism, as the FSLN appealed to some of the
organizations and created the Social Coordinator. The second challenge to the
argument is that the CODA was not always the leading organization on water
privatization. Until the co-optation of Ruth Herrera, the RNDC was at the forefront of water organizing, even with the creation of the CODA in 2005. Before
the co-optation of Ruth Herrera, the RNDC, although not a coalition, had a much
more cooperative relationship with the state.
The CPCs, like the RNDC, were created in a corporatist tradition by
Daniel Ortega. They were a co-opted organization that gave benefits to members
of the committees, but prevented those members from out-right challenging the
state and working for change. Instead of bringing citizen concerns to the
government, Ortega created the CPCs to provide support to the FSLN and the
FSLN-dominated executive branch of the government.
The need for change in Nicaragua has been an essential part of my thesis
and my central arguments. Daniel Ortega has repeatedly stated that Nicaragua is
in the second stage of the Sandinista revolution (and has been since his re-election
in 2006), yet detractors have refused to believe that Ortega’s actions and policy
are revolutionary, even though his discourse claims to be. Grigsby (2007) argues
that Nicaragua is not in revolutionary times, because “nobody is thinking or
talking about any structural change of society. This isn’t because the FSLN or
Daniel or Rosario [his wife] don’t want to do this, but rather because the political
possibilities don’t exist to achieve such economic or social transformations.”
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Although I agree with many of Grigsby’s key points, I disagree with this
statement.
Structural change in Nicaragua will not occur unless the government is
pressured into changing. No longer will Ortega lead the fight for change in the
country. Instead of adopting Grigsby’s passive view of change, my arguments in
this thesis assert that the agency of civil society organizations needs to be
recognized in examining how they decide to enter into cooperative relationships
with the state in order to pressure them to change state policies. Grigsby
continues, “we don’t have the right conditions” today to make change, and instead
must wait for certain objective conditions (such as economic and social problems
in society) to “combine with the subjective conditions.” Again, I disagree. I
believe that civil society organizations should not wait for conditions for change
to materialize out of thin air. Instead, they should set out to make those
conditions a reality. The best way for them to do so is to engage in collaborative,
cooperative partnerships with the state. A successful cooperative partnership
ensures that civil society organizations do not become a part of the state, and
therefore demobilize, nor become too autonomous or threatening to the state, and
therefore mobilize with few results.
My arguments carry important significance for Nicaraguan civil society.
Instead of waiting for the state to engage them, civil society organizations must
take initiative in interacting in a cooperative way with the state if they hope to
change conditions in Nicaraguan society. Organizations that were engaged in
corporatist relationships with the state were unable to work for change in society,
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although their members were able to benefit from clientelistic rewards. Although
largely undemocratic, this corporatist, clientelistic and co-optive tradition of
interaction between state and civil society continues to pervade the political
ideology of the FSLN and Daniel Ortega’s administration. Civil society
organizations operating in the liberal-democratic tradition of state-civil society
relationships have been unable to successfully engage the state, because they have
positioned themselves in an inherently conflictive relationship with the state. The
state distrusts and/or rejects the liberal organizations, therefore diminishing the
possibility of working for change in a state-run society.
My literature review argued that using only two perspectives on how to
view relationships between civil society and the state is limiting. The corporatist
and liberal-democratic perspectives are both inadequate in configuring successful
partnerships between civil society organizations and the state. My proposal of a
new terminology, the cooperative perspective, opens up the field of civil society
scholarship. It is my hope that this framing can be used in other countries that do
not have a strong history of liberal democracy, yet have a burgeoning or welldeveloped civil society. My analysis recognizes the agency of civil society
organizations, and allows for a more holistic and historically grounded approach
to civil society studies.
This thesis was limited in scope, in that I was unable to test all three parts
of my hypothesis. Prioritizing the importance of depth over breadth, I focused my
hypothesis on water privatization. Furthermore, since Nicaraguan water
privatization is a topic with little scholarship on it, it was important to write a
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historical account of water privatization to contribute to the growing amount of
research on water issues, especially with the threat that the world’s next conflicts
will be related to hydro-resources. It is my hope that future study can continue to
analyze and apply my hypothesis, to other cases in Nicaragua and to civil society
and state interactions in other Latin American countries, or countries in which the
corporatist and liberal models do not fit in a cookie-cutter mold. Do situations
exist in which complete autonomy or the lack there of are more beneficial to civil
society organizations than what I have termed ‘cooperation?’ And if so, how does
that relate to my research? These are questions to explore in future research.
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Index A:
List of Acronyms
ADIC: Association of Integral Community Development (Asociación de
Desarrollo Integral Comunitario)
ALN: National Liberal Alliance (Alianza Liberal Nacional)
AMAT: Water Company of Matagalpa (Empresa de Agua Matagalpa)
CAPS: Potable Water and Sanitation Committees (Comités de Agua Potable y
Saneamiento)
CC: Civil Coordinator (Coordinadora Civil)
CDS: Sandinista Defense Committees (Comites Defensa Sandinista)
CISAS: Center for Health Information and Accessbility Services (Centro de
Información y Servicios de Asesoría en Salud)
CODA: Coalition of Organizations for Water Rights (Coalición de
Organizaciones por el Derecho al Agua)
CS: Social Coordinator (Coordinadora Social)
ENACAL: Nicaraguan Aqueduct and Sanitary Sewer System (Empresa
Nicaragüense de Acueductos y Alcantarillado Sanitario)
ENEL: Nicaraguan Electrical Company (Empresa Nicaragüense de Electricidad)
ENITEL: Nicaraguan Telecommunications Company (Empresa Nicaragüense de
Telecomunicaciones)
FSLN: Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Nacional de Liberación
Nacional)
HIDROGESA: State Hydroelectric Energy Generation Company (Empresa
Hidroeléctrica de Generación)
IDB: InterAmerican Development Bank
IMF: International Monetary Fund
INAA: Nicaraguan Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (Instituto Nicaragüense de
Aqueductos y Alcantrillados)
LGAN 620: National General Water Law (Ley General de Aguas Nacionales)
LIDECONIC: Consumer Defense League of Nicaragua (Liga en Defensa de los
Consunidores de Nicaragua)
MCN: Nicaraguan Communal Movement (Movimiento Comunal Nicaragüense)
MRS: Sandinista Renovation Movement (Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista)
MSN Otro Mundo es Posible: Nicaraguan Social Movement Another World is
Possible
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
PB: Participatory Budgeting (Orçamento Participativo)
PLC: Constitutionalist Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista)
RNDC: National Network in Defense of Consumers (Red Nacional en Defensa de
los Consumidores)
SIMAS: Mesoamerican Information Service about Sustainable Agriculture
(Servicio de Información Mesoamericana sobre Agricultura Sostenible)
Tercer Foro del Lago: Third Lake Forum
UN: United Nations
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